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John Turri

philosophical science lab

more science, less fiction

method

Philosophy asks important questions. The history of philosophy is a treasure trove of inspiration and provocation. But philosophy does not have a distinctive methodology for answering its questions. Philosophers make progress by drawing on the findings and methodologies of other disciplines. In the Philosophical Science Lab, we use methods, concepts and findings from the cognitive, social, and life sciences to make progress on philosophical questions, new and old. Our work combines the conceptual clarity and rigor characteristic of the best philosophy with the discipline and vigor characteristic of empirical science.

Results

Our work helps answer philosophical questions while contributing to the scientific understanding of important social judgments and categories. Here are some examples.

This did not happen.

Rules pervade human society. They help us coordinate behavior, discourage undesirable conduct, and set common standards of evaluation. People are often blamed or even punished for breaking the rules. But other times they are excused. In the course of investigating philosophical disputes over the content of certain rules, we discovered something new and surprising about the way people think of rule-breaking. More specifically, we discovered that judging that someone blamelessly broke a rule can lead people to claim, paradoxically, that no rule was broken at all — an effect now known as “excuse validation.” The effect is surprisingly robust and it appears to be caused by a trade-off between accuracy and fairness in describing behavior. Even though excuse validation can seem illogical on the surface, it actually makes sense in light of prior work on the psychology of punishment and the evolution of rule-based social systems. It also turns out that certain philosophical debates have stalled because of excuse validation. In particular, excuse validation has motivated widespread objections against certain theories about ethics and language.

This is no liar.

Lying is an important social category. We react negatively to liars and their lies. But what is it to lie? The standard view in philosophy and social science is that a lie is a dishonest assertion. This view goes all the way back to at least the 4th century, when Augustine wrote, “He may say a true thing and yet lie, if he thinks it to be false and utters it for true.” On this view, lying is a purely psychological act: it does not require your assertion to be objectively false, only that you believe it is false. Through a series of behavioral experiments, we discovered evidence casting doubt on the standard view of lying. More specifically, we discovered evidence that if someone makes a dishonest assertion that turns out to be true, then he does not lie. Instead, he tried to lie but failed to do so. Thus lying is not a purely psychological act: it requires saying something that is objectively false.

This is not you.

Perhaps your life is nothing more than an elaborate dream sequence. Or perhaps you are just a “brain in a vat,” an experiment on the shelf in some neuroscientist’s laboratory. Do you know that you're not merely dreaming? Do you know that you're not a brain in a vat? No sane person actually believes such skeptical hypotheses. We know that they're not true. Yet skepticism has remained a serious topic of philosophical debate for centuries and it looms large in popular culture, including many Hollywood films such as The Matrix and Vanilla Sky. How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? Through a series of behavioral experiments, we discovered that skepticism gains its power because of two features of human psychology. First, humans evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, humans evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e. that something is not the case) than when it’s positive (i.e. that something is the case). It just so happens that skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are biased against this specific combination of source and content. Previous research in cognitive psychology had identified the two halves of this bias — source and content — separately. Through our research on skepticism and certain key philosophical thought experiments, we found that these two factors interact in an important and previously undiscovered way. This has, in turn, lead to new breakthroughs in the theory of knowledge.

This does not matter.

Sometimes morality is demanding. It can require sacrificing things you want. This has led many thoughtful people to wonder how much morality can demand of you. Are there any principled limits? A standard view, endorsed by many in the history of moral philosophy, is that moral duties are limited by ability: “ought implies can.” On this view, for example, if a child is drowning nearby but you are unable to save him, then you are not obligated to save him. Many have defended “ought implies can” on the grounds that it is a core commitment of commonsense morality, reflected in the very meaning of moral language. In the first investigation of its kind, we set out to discover whether commonsense morality is committed to “ought implies can.” Through a series of behavioral experiments, we found compelling evidence against this hypothesis. In a wide range of circumstances, people overwhelmingly attribute moral duties to people who cannot fulfill them, including mundane cases involving promises and extraordinary cases involving drowning children.

This is no problem.

In order to care for their offspring, parents must be able to re-identify their children in different circumstances. That is just one example when it is important for us to be able to identify and re-indentify other people. But what criteria are involved in our concept of personal identity? In recent decades, philosophers have debated the merits of various theories, but they all agree on one thing: one person cannot be in two places at the same time. This "one-person-one-place" rule is widely assumed to be an essential part of our ordinary concept of personal identity, but that assumption had never been tested, until now. In a groundbreaking series of studies, we found that people implicitly reject the one-person-one-place rule. Most people judged that one and the same person was in two different places at the same time. Indeed, they judged that a person continued existing in two different locations for an extended period time, up to at least a week, and while undergoing different bodily changes in the two locations.

Results

Our work helps answer philosophical questions while contributing to the scientific understanding of important social judgments and categories. Here are some examples.

Excuse validation

This did not happen.

Rules pervade human society. They help us coordinate behavior, discourage undesirable conduct, and set common standards of evaluation. People are often blamed or even punished for breaking the rules. But other times they are excused. In the course of investigating philosophical disputes over the content of certain rules, we discovered something new and surprising about the way people think of rule-breaking. More specifically, we discovered that judging that someone blamelessly broke a rule can lead people to claim, paradoxically, that no rule was broken at all — an effect now known as “excuse validation.” The effect is surprisingly robust and it appears to be caused by a trade-off between accuracy and fairness in describing behavior. Even though excuse validation can seem illogical on the surface, it actually makes sense in light of prior work on the psychology of punishment and the evolution of rule-based social systems. It also turns out that certain philosophical debates have stalled because of excuse validation. In particular, excuse validation has motivated widespread objections against certain theories about ethics and language.

Lying

This is no liar.

Lying is an important social category. We react negatively to liars and their lies. But what is it to lie? The standard view in philosophy and social science is that a lie is a dishonest assertion. This view goes all the way back to at least the 4th century, when Augustine wrote, “He may say a true thing and yet lie, if he thinks it to be false and utters it for true.” On this view, lying is a purely psychological act: it does not require your assertion to be objectively false, only that you believe it is false. Through a series of behavioral experiments, we discovered evidence casting doubt on the standard view of lying. More specifically, we discovered evidence that if someone makes a dishonest assertion that turns out to be true, then he does not lie. Instead, he tried to lie but failed to do so. Thus lying is not a purely psychological act: it requires saying something that is objectively false.

Skepticism

This is not you.

Perhaps your life is nothing more than an elaborate dream sequence. Or perhaps you are just a “brain in a vat,” an experiment on the shelf in some neuroscientist’s laboratory. Do you know that you're not merely dreaming? Do you know that you're not a brain in a vat? No sane person actually believes such skeptical hypotheses. We know that they're not true. Yet skepticism has remained a serious topic of philosophical debate for centuries and it looms large in popular culture, including many Hollywood films such as The Matrix and Vanilla Sky. How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? Through a series of behavioral experiments, we discovered that skepticism gains its power because of two features of human psychology. First, humans evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, humans evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e. that something is not the case) than when it’s positive (i.e. that something is the case). It just so happens that skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are biased against this specific combination of source and content. Previous research in cognitive psychology had identified the two halves of this bias — source and content — separately. Through our research on skepticism and certain key philosophical thought experiments, we found that these two factors interact in an important and previously undiscovered way. This has, in turn, lead to new breakthroughs in the theory of knowledge.

Duties

This does not matter.

Sometimes morality is demanding. It can require sacrificing things you want. This has led many thoughtful people to wonder how much morality can demand of you. Are there any principled limits? A standard view, endorsed by many in the history of moral philosophy, is that moral duties are limited by ability: “ought implies can.” On this view, for example, if a child is drowning nearby but you are unable to save him, then you are not obligated to save him. Many have defended “ought implies can” on the grounds that it is a core commitment of commonsense morality, reflected in the very meaning of moral language. In the first investigation of its kind, we set out to discover whether commonsense morality is committed to “ought implies can.” Through a series of behavioral experiments, we found compelling evidence against this hypothesis. In a wide range of circumstances, people overwhelmingly attribute moral duties to people who cannot fulfill them, including mundane cases involving promises and extraordinary cases involving drowning children.

Identity

This is no problem.

In order to care for their offspring, parents must be able to re-identify their children in different circumstances. That is just one example when it is important for us to be able to identify and re-indentify other people. But what criteria are involved in our concept of personal identity? In recent decades, philosophers have debated the merits of various theories, but they all agree on one thing: one person cannot be in two places at the same time. This "one-person-one-place" rule is widely assumed to be an essential part of our ordinary concept of personal identity, but that assumption had never been tested, until now. In a groundbreaking series of studies, we found that people implicitly reject the one-person-one-place rule. Most people judged that one and the same person was in two different places at the same time. Indeed, they judged that a person continued existing in two different locations for an extended period time, up to at least a week, and while undergoing different bodily changes in the two locations.

Team

Lab director

John Turri

John is Canada Research Chair in Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Waterloo.

Postdoctoral fellow

Wesley Buckwalter

Wesley's main areas of research are in philosophy of psychology, cognitive science and epistemology. He studies a wide range of philosophical categories and concepts in these areas, including knowledge, belief, delusion, action, assertion, functionalism, and phenomenal consciousness. Wesley’s research is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Graduate students

Peter Blouw

Peter is a PhD student in the philosophy department with interests spanning a number of topics related to cognitive science, semantics, and logic. His research is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Ashley Keefner

Ashley is a PhD student in the philosophy department at Waterloo and is also working toward her Graduate Diploma in Cognitive Science. She has a background in physics and her current interests are at the intersection of philosophy of science, evolutionary cognition, and ethics. Ashley’s research is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Janet Michaud

Janet is a PhD student in the philosophy department at Waterloo. Her main areas of research span a number of socially relevant topics in philosophy such as: social and feminist epistemologies, feminist philosophy of science, experimental philosophy and interdisciplinary collaboration. Some of her recent work in experimental philosophy focuses on values in science communication. Janet's research is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Sara Weaver

Sara is a PhD student in philosophy. In experimental philosophy her research focuses on the nature of folk intuitions about personal identity and modesty as a virtue. Other areas of interest include philosophy of biology, feminist philosophy, epistemology of science, and feminist philosophy. She has a BA in psychology and philosophy from the University of British Columbia Okanagan and an MA in philosophy from the University of Alberta. Much of Sara's graduate work is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Collaborators

Dr. Mathieu Doucet

Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of Waterloo

Matt’s main area of research is in ethics, with an emphasis on moral psychology. His current research concentrates on weakness of will, hypocrisy, and the moral significance of self-knowledge. He also has research interests in biomedical ethics and in the philosophy of sports.

Dr. Heather Douglas

Associate Professor of Philosophy
Waterloo Chair in Science and Society
University of Waterloo

Heather is the Waterloo Chair in Science and Society in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Her work focuses on understanding science in the broader societal context. She received her Ph.D. from the History and Philosophy of Science Department at the University of Pittsburgh in 1998. Her work has been supported by the National Science Foundation and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. She has published numerous articles as well as a book, Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009).

websitegoogle scholar profile

Dr. Ori Friedman

Professor of Psychology (Developmental)
University of Waterloo

Ori is interested in social cognitive development and related topics. HIs main lines of research concern children's and adults' reasoning about: 1) ownership of property; 2) pretense and fiction; and 3) mental states.

Dr. Joshua Knobe

Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Yale University

J. Charles Millar

Charles completed his Honours BSc in Psychology at the University of Toronto and a MASc at Waterloo under the supervision of Dr. Ori Friedman. Charles investigates people's ethical judgments in moral dilemmas involving harm to people and destructive ownership violations. He also studies people's attachment to possessions and the individual differences which influence these attachments.

David Rose

PhD candidate in Philosophy
Rutgers University

David is a graduate student in the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He came to Rutgers in 2011 and is currently working on issues at the intersection of cognitive science, metaphysics, and epistemology. Before Rutgers, David earned an MS in Logic, Computation and Methodology from Carnegie Mellon University and a BA in Philosophy and Psychology from Ohio University.

Angelo Turri

Independent scholar

Angelo enjoys studying math, science, and philosophy.

Topics

Previous and current work in the lab addresses a wide range of philosophical topics. The central focus is on categories relevant to social cognition. We have done work on the following topics.

knowledge

Belief

assertion

rules

decision

certainty

action

luck

blame

excuse

obligation

ability

experience

will

identity

delusion

lies

values

truth

trust

probability

Conditionals

doubt

reasoning

Publications

Electronic versions are provided as a professional courtesy to ensure timely dissemination of academic work for individual, noncommercial purposes. Copyright (and all rights therein) resides with the respective copyright holders, as stated within each paper. As per Fair Use guidelines, these materials may be used for "criticism, comment, newsreporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research." All other uses of these materials are prohibited.

Turri, J. (in press). Experimental, cross-cultural, and classical Indian epistemology. Journal of Indian council of philosophical research. [download]

Buckwalter, W. (in press) Ability, responsibility, and global justice. Journal of Indian council of philosophical research. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). Experimental work on the norms of assertion. Philosophy compass. [download]

Buckwalter, W. (in press). Epistemic contextualism and linguistic behavior. In J. J. Ichikawa (Ed.), Routledge handbook of contextualism. Routledge. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). Compatibilism can be natural. Consciousness and cognition. [download]

Buckwalter, W. & Tullman, K (in press). The genuine attitude view of fictional belief. In H. Bradley, E. Sullivan-Bissett & P. Noordhof (Eds.), Art and the nature of belief. Oxford University Press. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). Knowledge attributions in iterated fake-barn cases. Analysis. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). The distinctive ‘should’ of assertability. Philosophical psychology. [download

Turri, J. (in press). Knowledge attributions and behavioral predictions. Cognitive science. [download

Turri, J. (in press). Exceptionalist naturalism: human agency and the causal order. Quarterly journal of experimental psychology. [download

Weaver, S. & Turri, J. (in press). Personal identity and persisting as many. In T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe & S. Nichols (Eds.), Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, volume 2. Oxford University Press. [download

Turri, J. (in press). The non-factive turn in epistemology: some hypotheses. In V. Mitova (Ed.), The factive turn in epistemology. Cambridge University Press. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). Virtue epistemology and abilism on knowledge. In H. Battaly (Ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. [download

Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (in press). Moderate scientism in philosophy.  In J.R. Ridder, R. Peels & R. van Woudenberg, Scientism: prospects and problems. Oxford University Press. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). Compatibilism and incompatibilism in social cognition. Cognitive science. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). Primate social cognition and the core human knowledge concept. In E. McCready, M. Mizumoto, J. Stanley & S. Stich (Eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world: linguistic and cultural diversity and epistemology. Oxford University Press. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). Epistemic situationism and cognitive ability. In M. Alfano & A. Fairweather (Eds.), Epistemic situationism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). The radicalism of truth-insensitive epistemology: truth's profound effect on the evaluation of belief. Philosophy and phenomenological research. [download]

Turri, J. (in press). Sustaining rules: a model and application. In J. A. Carter, E. C. Gordon & B. Jarvis (Eds.), Knowledge first. Oxford University Press. [download]

Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (in press). In the thick of moral motivation. Review of philosophy and psychology. [download]

Blouw, P., Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (in press). Gettier cases: a taxonomy. In R. Borges, C. de Almeida & P. Klein (Eds.), Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. Oxford University Press. [download]

Turri, J., Friedman, O. & Keefner, A. (2017). Knowledge central: a central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations. Quarterly journal of experimental psychology, 70(3), 504-515 . [download]

Turri, J. (2017). Epistemic contextualism: an idle hypothesis. Australasian journal of philosophy, 95(1), 141-156. [download]

Turri, J. & Buckwalter, W. (2017). Descartes's schism, Locke's reunion: completing the pragmatic turn in epistemology. American philosophical quarterly, 54(1), 25-46. [download]

Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge and the norm of assertion: an essay in philosophical science. Open Book Publishers.. [download]

Sytsma, J. & Buckwalter, W., eds. (2016). A companion to experimental philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. [intro]

Turri, J. (2016). A new paradigm for epistemology: from reliabilism to abilism. Ergo, 3(8), 189-231. [download]

Turri, J., Buckwalter, W. & Rose, D. (2016). Actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments. Thought, 5(3), 212–222. [download

Turri, J. (2016). The point of assertion is to transmit knowledge. Analysis ,76(2), 130-136. [download]

Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge and assertion in "Gettier" cases. Philosophical psychology 29(5), 759-775. [download]

Turri, A. & Turri, J. (2016). Lying, uptake, assertion, and intent. International review of pragmatics, 8(2), 314–333. [download]

Turri, J. (2016). Vision, knowledge, and assertion. Consciousness and cognition, 41(C), 41-49. [download]

Turri, J. (2016). How to do better: toward normalizing experimentation in epistemology. In J. Nado (Ed.), Advances in experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology. Bloomsbury Academic. [download]

Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge, certainty and assertion. Philosophical psychology, 29(2), 293-299. [download]

Keefner, A. (2016). Corvids infer the mental states of conspecifics. Biology & philosophy, 31(2): 267-281.

Turri, J. (2016). Perceptions of philosophical inquiry: a survey. Review of philosophy and psychology 7(4), 805-816. [download]

Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2016). Perceived weakness of philosophical inquiry: a comparison to psychology. Philosophia, 44(1), 33-52. [download]

Buckwalter, W. (2016). Intuition fail: philosophical activity and the limits of expertise. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 92(2), 378-410. [download]

Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge judgments in “Gettier" cases. In J. Sytsma & W. Buckwalter (Eds.), A companion to experimental philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. [download]

Turri, J. (2015). Understanding and the norm of explanation. Philosophia 43(4), 1171-1175. [download]

Turri, J. (2015). Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision. Synthese, 192(12), 4009-4030. [download]

Friedman, O. & Turri, J. (2015). Is probabilistic evidence a source of knowledge? Cognitive science, 39(5), 1062-1080. [download]

Buckwalter, W., Rose, D. & Turri, J. (2015). Belief through thick and thin. Noûs, 49(4), 748 -775. [download]

Buckwalter, W. & Schaffer, J. (2015). Knowledge, stakes, and mistakes. Noûs, 49(2), 201-234. [download]

Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2015). Inability and obligation in moral judgment. PLOS One, 10(8), e0136589. [download]

Turri, A. & Turri, J. (2015). The truth about lying. Cognition 138(C), 161-168. [download]

Turri, J. & Blouw, P. (2015). Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking. Philosophical studies, 172(3), 615–634. [download]

Turri, J. (2015). Selfless assertions: some empirical evidence. Synthese, 192(4), 1221–1223. [download]

Turri, J., Buckwalter, W. & Blouw, P. (2015). Knowledge and luck. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 22(2), 378–390. [download]

Turri, J. (2015). An open and shut case: epistemic closure in the manifest image. Philosophers’ Imprint, 15(2), 1–18. [download]

Turri, J. (2015). Skeptical appeal: the source-content bias. Cognitive science, 39(2), 307–324. [download]

Turri, J. (2015). Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test. Synthese, 192(2), 385–392. [download]

Turri, J. (2015). Assertion and assurance: some empirical evidence. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 90(1), 214–222. [download]

Turri, J. (2015). From virtue epistemology to abilism: theoretical and empirical developments. In C. B. Miller, M. R. Furr, A. Knobel & W. Fleeson (Eds.), Character: new directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology. Oxford University Press. [download]

Millar, J.C., Turri, J. & Friedman, O. (2014). For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 133(1), 79–84. [download]

Buckwalter, W. (2014). Factive verbs and protagonist projection. Episteme, 11(4), 391-409. [download]

Rose, D., Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2014). When words speak louder than actions: delusion, belief and the power of assertion. Australasian journal of philosophy, 92(4), 683-700. [download]

Tullmann, K. & Buckwalter, W. (2014). Does the paradox of fiction exist? Erkenntnis, 79(4), 779–796. [download]

Colaco, D., Buckwalter, W., Stich, S. & Machery, E. (2014). Epistemic intuitions in fake-barn thought experiments. Episteme, 11(02), 199–212. [download]

Turri, J. & Friedman, O. (2014). Winners and losers in the folk epistemology of lotteries. In J. R. Beebe (Ed.), Advances in experimental epistemology. Continuum. [download]

Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2014). Telling, showing and knowing: A unified theory of pedagogical norms. Analysis, 74(1), 16–20. [download]

Turri, J. (2014). The problem of ESEE knowledge. Ergo, 1(4), 101-127. [download]

Buckwalter, W. & Phelan, M. (2014). Phenomenal consciousness disembodied. In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Continuum. [download]

Doucet, M. & Turri, J. (2014). Non-psychological weakness of will: self-control, stereotypes, and consequences. Synthese, 191(16), 3935–54. [download]

Buckwalter, W. (2013). Gettier Made ESEE. Philosophical psychology, (3):1-16.

Buckwalter, W. & Phelan, M. (2013). Function and feeling machines: a defense of the philosophical conception of subjective experience. Philosophical studies, 166 (2), 349-361. [download]

Turri, J. (2013). The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion. Cognition, 129(2), 279–291. [download]

Turri, J. (2013). A conspicuous art: putting Gettier to the test. Philosophers’ imprint, 13(10), 1–16. [download]

recent presentations

Buckwalter, W. (2017). Moral responsibility and implicit social cognition. Presented at Carleton University, Ottawa, ON.

Buckwalter, W. (2017). Implicit bias and moral judgment. Presented at Lycoming College, Williamsport, PA.

Buckwalter, W. (2017). Epistemic injustice in social cognition. Presented at University of Illinois, Urbana, IL.

Buckwalter, W. (2017). Moral responsibility and implicit social cognition. Presented at Carleton University, Ottawa, ON.

Turri, A. & Turri, J. (2016). Lying, fast and slow. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Turri, J. (2016). Comments on “Epistemic closure in folk epistemology.” Minds Online 2016.

Buckwalter, W. (2016). Comments on “Epistemic closure in folk epistemology.” Minds Online 2016.

Buckwalter, W. (2016). Epistemic injustice in social cognition. Presented at York University, Toronto, ON.

Turri, J. (2015). Knowledge and the norm of assertion. Presented at The Geography of Philosophy: Knowledge, Person, and Wisdom workshop, Pittsburgh, PA.

McChesney, D., Drecun, D. & Turri, J. (2015). Subsistence rights and intuitions about institutional obligation. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Buckwalter, W., Rose, D. & Turri, J. (2015). Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Weaver, S., Doucet, M. & Turri, J. (2015). Modesty is not a virtue. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Turri, J. (2015). Exceptionalist naturalism: human agency and the causal order. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Michaud, J. & Keefner, A. (2015). Judgments of coercion in Mr. Big cases. Presented at the 6th Annual Experimental Philosophy Group UK Conference: Joining Forces of Philosophy and the Empirical Sciences to Tackle Social Injustices, University of Nottingham.

Turri, J. (2015). Compatibilism and incompatibilism in social cognition. Presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University.

Rose, D., Buckwalter, W. & Nichols, S. (2015). Neuroscientific prediction and the intrusion of intuitive metaphysics. Presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University.

Buckwalter, W., Turri, J. (2015). Inability and obligation in moral judgment. Presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University.

Buckwalter, W. (2015). Inability and obligation in moral judgment. Presented at Reykjavik Summer Philosophy Colloquium, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland.

Michaud, J. & Turri, J. (2015). Three factors that affect the credibility of scientific research. Presented at the Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Science, Ottawa, ON.

Weaver, S., Doucet, M. & Turri, J. (2015). Modesty is not a virtue. Presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University.

Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2015). Comparative epistemology: the origins of theory of mind capacities in human and non-human primates. Presented at the Nature and Origins of Human Cognition conference, Berlin, Germany.

Weaver, S., Doucet, M. & Turri, J. (2015). Modesty is not a virtue. Presented at the Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association, Ottawa, ON.

Michaud, J. & Turri, J. (2015). Values in science communication. Presented at the Second Annual Meeting of SRPoiSE (Socially Relevant Philosophy of/in Science and Engineering), Detroit, MI.

Turri, J. (2015). Knowledge and the norm of assertion. Presented at McMaster University, Hamilton, ON.

Turri, J. & Friedman, O. (2014). Inside and outside, present and absent. Presented at the Primate Epistemology Workshop, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2014). The connection between knowledge and action. Presented at the “Primate Epistemology” workshop, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

Turri, J., Rose, D. & Buckwalter, W. (2014). Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology. Presented at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

Douglas, H., Turri, J. & Buckwalter, W. (2014). Inductive risk and data on values in science. Presented at the Philosophy of Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Michaud, J. & Keefner, A. (2014). Judgements of coercion in Mr. Big cases. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Weaver, S. & Turri, J. (2014). Personal identity and persisting as many. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2014). Inability and obligation in moral judgment. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Turri, J. (2014). A new paradigm for epistemology. Keynote Address at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Turri, J., Blouw, P. & Buckwalter, W. (2014). Knowledge and luck. Presented at the CogSci 2014, Quebec City.

Rose, D., Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2014). When words speak louder than actions: delusion, belief and the power of assertion. Presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Vancouver, British Columbia.

Turri, J., Rose, D. & Buckwalter, W. (2014). Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology. Presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Vancouver, British Columbia.

Millar, C., Friedman, O. & Turri, J. (2014). For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment. Presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Vancouver, British Columbia.

Doucet, M. & Turri, J. (2014). Weakness of will without commitment violations? Presented at the Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association, St. Catherine's, Ontario.

Turri, J. & Buckwalter, W. (2014). Action, truth and knowledge. Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association, St. Catharine's, Ontario.

Turri, J. (2013). An open and shut case: epistemic closure in folk epistemology. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Blouw, P., Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2013). Knowledge and luck. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Turri, J. (2013). An open and shut case: epistemic closure in the manifest image. Presented at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ.

Turri, J. & Blouw, P. (2013). Excuse validation. Presented at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference, Boulder, CO.

Turri, J. & Friedman, O. (2013). The folk epistemology of lotteries. Presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Providence, RI.

Turri, J. & Blouw, P. (2013). Excuse validation. Presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Providence, RI.

Millar, C., Friedman, O. & Turri, J. (2013). Moral decision making and interpersonal harm. Presented at the Southern Ontario Behavioral Decision Research Conference, Waterloo, Ontario.

Turri, J. (2013). The test of truth: an experimental investigation of the norm of assertion. Northwestern University. Evanston, IL.

Blouw, P. & Turri, J. (2013). Counterfactuals and scope of moral cognition. Presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association. Victoria, BC.

Turri, J. (2012). The test of truth: an experimental investigation of the norm of assertion. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY.

Buckwalter, W. (2012). Factive verbs and protagonist projection. Presented at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY. 

Turri, J. (2012). Abilism and reliabilism. Presented at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ.