John Turri

philosophical science



  1. Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge and the norm of assertion: an essay in philosophical science. Open Book Publishers.
  2. Turri, J. (2014). Epistemology: a guide. Wiley-Blackwell.
  3. Littlejohn, C., & Turri, J., Eds. (2014). Epistemic norms: new essays on action, belief and assertion. Oxford University Press.
  4. Turri, J., & Klein, P., Eds. (2014). Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism. Oxford University Press.
  5. Steup, M., Turri, J., & Sosa, E., Eds. (2013). Contemporary debates in epistemology, 2ed. Wiley Blackwell.
  6. Turri, J. (Ed.). (2013). Virtuous thoughts: the philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer.
  7. Greco, J., & Turri, J, Eds. (2012). Virtue epistemology: contemporary readings. MIT Press.

ARticles & Chapters

  1. Turri, J. (in press). How "ought" exceeds but implies "can": description and encouragement in moral judgment. Cognition.

    Abstract: This paper tests a theory about the relationship between two important topics in moral philosophy and psychology. One topic is the function of normative language, specifically claims that one “ought” to do something. Do these claims function to describe moral responsibilities, encourage specific behavior, or both? The other topic is the relationship between saying that one “ought” to do something and one’s ability to do it. In what respect, if any, does what one “ought” to do exceed what one “can” do? The theory tested here has two parts: (1) “ought” claims function to both describe responsibilities and encourage people to fulfill them (the dual-function hypothesis); (2) the two functions relate differently to ability, because the encouragement function is limited by the person’s ability, but the descriptive function is not (the interaction hypothesis). If this theory is correct, then in one respect “ought implies can” is false because people have responsibilities that exceed their abilities. But in another respect “ought implies can” is legitimate because it is not worthwhile to encourage people to do things that exceed their ability. Results from two behavioral experiments support the theory that “ought” exceeds but implies “can.” Results from a third experiment provide further evidence regarding an “ought” claim’s primary function and how contextual features can affect the interpretation of its functions.
  2. Turri, J. (in press). Epistemic modals and alternative possibilities. Erkenntnis.

    Abstract: Indicative judgments pertain to what is true. Epistemic modal judgments pertain to what must or might be true relative to a body of information. A standard view is that epistemic modals implicitly quantify over alternative possibilities, or ways things could turn out. On this view, a proposition must be true just in case it is true in all the possibilities consistent with the available information, and a proposition might be true just in case it is true in at least one possibility consistent with the available information. I report three experiments testing this view of epistemic modals. The results show that although modal judgments are sensitive to information about alternative possibilities, the standard quantification theory mischaracterizes the ordinary meaning of modals. I then report two more experiments testing the hypothesis that epistemic modals express willingness to attribute knowledge based on the available information. The results support this hypothesis. The results also show that the difference between “inside” and “outside” probabilistic information, familiar from the judgment and decision-making literature, affects epistemic modal judgments.
  3. Weaver, S., Doucet, M. & Turri, J. (in press). It's what's on the inside that counts ... or is it? Virtue and the psychological criteria of modesty. Review of philosophy and psychology.

    Abstract: Philosophers who have written on modesty have largely agreed that it is a virtue, and that it therefore has an important psychological component. Mere modest behavior, it is often argued, is actually false modesty if it is generated by the wrong kind of mental state. The philosophical debate about modesty has largely focused on the question of which kind of mental state—cognitive, motivational, or evaluative—best captures the virtue of modesty. We therefore conducted a series of experiments to see which philosophical account matches the folk concept of modesty. Surprisingly, we found that the folk concept is primarily behavioral. This leads us to argue that modesty may not be a virtue, but that if it is none of the extant philosophical accounts have properly explained why.
  4. Turri, J. (in press). Experimental, cross-cultural, and classical Indian epistemology. Journal of Indian council of philosophical research.

    Abstract: This paper connects recent findings from experimental epistemology to several major themes in classical Indian epistemology. First, current evidence supports a specific account of the ordinary knowledge concept in contemporary anglophone American culture. According to this account, known as abilism, knowledge is a true representation produced by cognitive ability. I present evidence that abilism closely approximates Nyāya epistemology’s theory of knowledge, especially that found in the Nyāya-sūtra. Second, Americans are more willing to attribute knowledge of positive facts than of negative facts, especially when such facts are inferred and even when the positive and negative “facts” are logically equivalent. Similar suspicions about knowledge of negative facts (absences) seemingly occur in classical Indian epistemology, suggesting that the asymmetry might not be an American quirk but instead reflect cross-culturally robust asymmetry in knowledge attributions. Each of these themes — abilism and the positive/negative asymmetry — presents an exciting opportunity for further research in experimental cross-cultural epistemology.
  5. Turri, J. (in press). Compatibilism can be natural. Consciousness and cognition.

    Abstract: Compatibilism is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Natural compatibilism is the view that in ordinary social cognition, people are compatibilists. Researchers have recently debated whether natural compatibilism is true. This paper presents six experiments (N = 909) that advance this debate. The results provide the best evidence to date for natural compatibilism, avoiding the main methodological problems faced by previous work supporting the view. In response to simple scenarios about familiar activities, people judged that agents had moral responsibilities to perform actions that they were unable to perform (Experiment 1), were morally responsible for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 2), were to blame for unavoidable outcomes (Experiments 3-4), deserved blame for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 5), and should suffer consequences for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 6). These findings advance our understanding of moral psychology and philosophical debates that depend partly on patterns in commonsense morality.
  6. Turri, J. (in press). Knowledge attributions and behavioral predictions. Cognitive science.

    Abstract: Recent work has shown that knowledge attributions affect how people think others should behave, more so than belief attributions do. This paper reports two experiments providing evidence that (i) knowledge attributions also affect behavioral predictions more strongly than belief attributions do, and (ii) knowledge attributions facilitate faster behavioral predictions than belief attributions do. Thus knowledge attributions play multiple critical roles in social cognition, guiding judgments about how people should and will behave.
  7. Turri, J. (in press). Experimental work on the norms of assertion. Philosophy compass.

    Abstract: Communication is essential to human society and assertion is central to communication. This article reviews evidence from life science, cognitive science, and philosophy relevant to understanding how our social practice of assertion is structured and sustained. The principal conclusion supported by this body of evidence is that knowledge is a central norm of assertion — that is, according to the rules of the practice, assertions should express knowledge.
  8. Turri, J. (in press). Knowledge attributions in iterated fake barn cases. Analysis.

    Abstract: In a single-iteration fake barn case, the agent correctly identifies an object of interest on the first try, despite the presence of nearby lookalikes that could have mislead her. In a multiple-iteration fake barn case, the agent first encounters several fakes, misidentifies each of them, and then encounters and correctly identifies a genuine item of interest. Prior work has established that people tend to attribute knowledge in single-iteration fake barn cases, but multiple-iteration cases have not been tested. However, some theorists contend that multiple-iteration cases are more important and will elicit a strong tendency to deny knowledge. Here I report a behavioral experiment investigating knowledge judgments in multiple-iteration fake barn cases. The main finding is that people tend to attribute knowledge in these cases too. Ironically, the results indicate that the presence of fakes could prevent iterated errors from lowering knowledge attributions. The results also provide evidence that ordinary knowledge attributions are based on attributions of cognitive ability.
  9. Turri, J. (in press). The distinctive "should" of assertability. Philosophical psychology.

    Abstract: Recent work has assumed that the normativity associated with assertion differs from the normativity of morality, practical rationality, etiquette, and legality. That is, whether an assertion “should” be made is not merely a function of these other familiar sorts of normativity and is especially connected to truth. Some researchers have challenged this assumption of distinctive normativity. In this paper I report two experiments that test the assumption. Participants read a brief story, judged whether an assertion should be made, and rated several other qualities of the assertion, including its truth value, morality, rationality, etiquette, legality, and folly. Of all these qualities, truth value most strongly predicted assertability. The findings support the assumption of distinctive normativity and provide further evidence that the norm of our social practice of assertion is factive (i.e. it makes truth essential to assertability).
  10. Turri, J. (in press). Exceptionalist naturalism: human agency and the causal order. Quarterly journal of experimental psychology.

    Abstract: This paper addresses a fundamental question in folk metaphysics: how do we ordinarily view human agency? According to the transcendence account, we view human agency as standing outside of the causal order and imbued with exceptional powers. According to a naturalistic account, we view human agency as subject to the same physical laws as other objects and completely open to scientific investigation. According to exceptionalist naturalism, the truth lies somewhere in between: we view human agency as fitting broadly within the causal order while still being exceptional in important respects. In this paper, I report seven experiments designed to decide between these three competing theories. Across a variety of contexts and types of action, participants agreed that human agents can resist outcomes described as inevitable, guaranteed, and causally determined. Participants viewed non-human animal agents similarly, whereas they viewed computers, robots, and simple inanimate objects differently. At the same time, participants judged that human actions are caused by many things, including psychological, neurological, and social events. Overall, in folk metaphysics, human and non-human animals are viewed as exceptional parts of the natural world.
  11. Weaver, S. & Turri, J. (in press). Personal identity and persisting as many. In T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe & S. Nichols (Eds.), Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, volume 2. Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: Many philosophers hypothesize that our concept of personal identity is partly constituted by the one-person-one-place rule, which states that a person can only be in one place at a time. This hypothesis has been assumed by the most influential contemporary work on personal identity. In this paper, we report a series of studies testing whether the hypothesis is true. In these studies, people consistently judged that the same person existed in two different places at the same time. This result undermines some widely held philosophical assumptions, supports others, and fits well with recent discoveries on identity judgments about inanimate objects and non-human animals.
  12. Turri, J. (in press). The non-factive turn in epistemology: some hypotheses. In V. Mitova (Ed.), The factive turn in epistemology. Cambridge University Press.

    Abstract: I evaluate non-factive or truth-insensitive accounts of the ordinary concepts used to evaluate beliefs, evidence, assertions, and decisions. Recent findings show that these accounts are mistaken. I propose three hypotheses regarding how philosophers defending these accounts got things so wrong. I also consider one potential consequence for the discipline.
  13. Turri, J. (in press). Virtue epistemology and abilism on knowledge. In H. Battaly (Ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge.

    Abstract: Virtue epistemologists define knowledge as true belief produced by intellectual virtue. In this paper, I review how this definition fails in three important ways. First, it fails as an account of the ordinary knowledge concept, because neither belief nor reliability is essential to knowledge ordinarily understood. Second, it fails as an account of the knowledge relation itself, insofar as that relation is operationalized in the scientific study of cognition. Third, it serves no prescriptive purpose identified up till now. An alternative theory, abilism, provides a superior account of knowledge as it is ordinarily and scientifically understood. According to abilism, knowledge is an accurate representation produced by cognitive ability.
  14. Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (in press). Moderate scientism in philosophy. In J.R. Ridder, R. Peels & R. van Woudenberg, Scientism: prospects and problems. Oxford University Press

    Abstract: Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. In this paper, we evaluate moderate scientism in philosophy. We review several ways that science has contributed to research in epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. We also review several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, we conclude that the case for moderate philosophical scientism is strong: scientific practice has promoted significant progress in philosophy and its further development should be welcomed and encouraged.
  15. Turri, J. (in press). Compatibilism and incompatibilism in social cognition. Cognitive science.

    Abstract: Compatibilism is the view that determinism is compatible with acting freely and being morally responsible. Incompatibilism is the opposite view. It is often claimed that compatibilism or incompatibilism is a natural part of ordinary social cognition. That is, it is often claimed that patterns in our everyday social judgments reveal an implicit commitment to either compatibilism or incompatibilism. This paper reports five experiments (N = 1100) designed to identify such patterns. The results support a nuanced hybrid account: the central tendencies in ordinary social cognition are compatibilism about moral responsibility, compatibilism about positive moral accountability (i.e. deserving credit for good outcomes), neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism about negative moral accountability (i.e. deserving blame for bad outcomes), compatibilism about choice for actions with positive outcomes, and incompatibilism about choice for actions with negative or neutral outcomes.
  16. Turri, J. (in press). Primate social cognition and the core human knowledge concept. In E. McCready, M. Mizumoto, J. Stanley, and S. Stich (Eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world: linguistic and cultural diversity and epistemology. Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: I review recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether humans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk epistemology. I argue that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More specifically, recent work shows that knowledge attributions are a central part of primate social cognition, used to predict others’ behavior and guide decision-making. The core primate knowledge concept is that of truth detection (across different sensory modalities) and retention (through memory) and may also include rudimentary forms of indirect truth discovery through inference. In virtue of their evolutionary heritage, humans inherited the primate social-cognitive system and thus share this core knowledge concept.
  17. Blouw, P., Buckwalter, W., & Turri, J. (in press). Gettier cases: a taxonomy. In R. Borges, C. de Almeida, & P. Klein (Eds.), Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: The term “Gettier Case” is a technical term frequently applied to a wide array of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology. What do these cases have in common? It is said that they all involve a justified true belief which, intuitively, is not knowledge, due to a form of luck called “Gettiering.” While this very broad characterization suffices for some purposes, it masks radical diversity. We argue that the extent of this diversity merits abandoning the notion of a “Gettier Case” in a favour of more finely grained terminology. We propose such terminology, and use it to effectively sort the myriad Gettier cases from the theoretical literature in a way that charts deep fault lines in ordinary judgments about knowledge.
  18. Turri, J. (in press). Sustaining rules: a model and application. In J. A. Carter, E. C. Gordon, & B. Jarvis (Eds.), Knowledge first. Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: I introduce an account of when a rule normatively sustains a practice. My basic proposal is that a rule normatively sustains a practice when the value achieved by following the rule explains why agents continue following that rule, thus establishing and sustaining a pattern of activity. I apply this model to practices of belief management and identify a substantive normative connection between knowledge and belief.
  19. Turri, J. (2017). Epistemic contextualism: an idle hypothesisAustralasian journal of philosophy, 95(1), 141–156.

    Abstract: Epistemic contextualism is one of the most influential and hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. Contextualists claim that “know” is a context sensitive verb associated with different evidential standards in different contexts. Contextualists motivate their view based on a set of behavioral claims. In this paper, I show that several of these behavioral claims are false. I also show that contextualist test cases suffer from a critical confound, which derives from people’s tendency to defer to speakers’ statements about their own mental states. My evidence consists in results from several behavioral experiments. I conclude that contextualism is an idle hypothesis and propose some general methodological lessons.
  20. Turri, J., Friedman, O., & Keefner, A. (2017). Knowledge central: a central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations. Quarterly journal of experimental psychology, 70(3), 504–515.

    Abstract: Five experiments (N =1710) demonstrate the central role of knowledge attributions in social evaluations. In Experiments 1-3, we manipulated whether an agent believes, is certain of, or knows a true proposition and asked people to rate whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. We found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent should act. In Experiments 4-5, we investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can explain an important finding on how people act based on statistical evidence, known as “the Wells effect."
  21. Turri, J. (2017). Descartes's schism, Locke's Reunion: completing the pragmatic turn in epistemology. American philosophical quarterly, 54(1), 25-46.

    Abstract: Centuries ago, Descartes and Locke initiated a foundational debate in epistemology over the relationship between knowledge, on the one hand, and practical factors, on the other. Descartes claimed that knowledge and practice are fundamentally separate. Locke claimed that knowledge and practice are fundamentally united. After a period of dormancy, their disagreement has reignited on the contemporary scene. Latter-day Lockeans claim that knowledge itself is essentially connected to, and perhaps even constituted by, practical factors such as how much is at stake, how important the situation is, or how one should act. Latter-day Cartesians claim, by contrast, that knowledge is entirely constituted by truth-related factors such as truth, belief, and evidence. Each side has supported its case with claims about patterns in ordinary behavior and knowledge judgments. Lockeans argue that these patterns are best explained by positing a fundamental and direct link between knowledge and practical factors. Cartesians argue that the patterns can be equally well explained by positing an indirect link, entirely mediated by the traditional factors of truth, belief, and evidence, thereby rendering the Lockean hypothesis unnecessary. We argue that Cartesians are right about some practical factors, in particular stakes and how important a situation is, which have, at best, a modest indirect relationship to knowledge. However, Lockeans are right about actionability: whether a person should pursue a course of action is unquestionably very powerfully and directly connected to knowledge.
  22. Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2017). In the thick of moral motivation. Review of philosophy and psychology, 8(2), 433-453.

    Abstract: We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we expose the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology as a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.
  23. Turri, J. (2016). The radicalism of truth-insensitive epistemology: truth’s profound effect on the evaluation of belief. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 93(2), 348-367.

    Abstract: Many philosophers claim that interesting forms of epistemic evaluation are insensitive to truth in a very specific way. Suppose that two possible agents believe the same proposition based on the same evidence. Either both are justified or neither is; either both have good evidence for holding the belief or neither does. This does not change if, on this particular occasion, it turns out that only one of the two agents has a true belief. Epitomizing this line of thought are thought experiments about radically deceived “brains in vats.” It is widely and uncritically assumed that such a brain is equally justified as its normally embodied human “twin.” This “parity” intuition is the heart of truth-insensitive theories of core epistemological properties such as justification and rationality. Rejecting the parity intuition is considered radical and revisionist. In this paper, I show that exactly the opposite is true. The parity intuition is idiosyncratic and widely rejected. A brain in a vat is not justified and has worse evidence than its normally embodied counterpart. On nearly every ordinary way of evaluating beliefs, a false belief is significantly inferior to a true belief. Of all the evaluations studied here, only blamelessness is truth-insensitive.
  24. Turri, J., Buckwalter, W. & Rose, D. (2016). Actionability judgments cause knowledge judgmentsThought, 5(3), 212–222.

    Abstract: Researchers recently demonstrated a strong direct relationship between judgments about what a person knows (“knowledge judgments”) and judgments about how a person should act (“actionability judgments”). But it remains unknown whether actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments, or knowledge judgments cause actionability judgments. This paper uses causal modeling to help answer this question. Across two experiments, we found evidence that actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments.
  25. Turri, J. (2016). The point of assertion is to transmit knowledgeAnalysis, 76(2), 130-136.

    Abstract: Recent work in philosophy and cognitive science shows that knowledge is the norm of our social practice of assertion, in the sense that an assertion should express knowledge. But why should an assertion express knowledge? I hypothesize that an assertion should express knowledge because the point of assertion is to transmit knowledge. I present evidence supporting this hypothesis.
  26. Turri, A. & Turri, J. (2016). Lying, uptake, assertion, and intentInternational Review of Pragmatics, 8(2), 314–333.

    Abstract: A standard view in social science and philosophy is that a lie is a dishonest assertion: to lie is to assert something that you think is false in order to deceive your audience. We report four behavioral experiments designed to evaluate some aspects of this view. Participants read short scenarios and judged several features of interest, including whether an agent lied. We found evidence that ordinary lie attributions can be influenced by aspects of audience uptake, are based on judging that the agent made an assertion (assertion attributions), and, at least in some contexts, are not based on attributions of deceptive intent. The finding on assertion attributions is predicted by the standard view, but the finding on intent attributions is not. These results help to further clarify the ordinary concept of lying and shed light on the psychological processes involved in ordinary lie attributions and related judgments.
  27. Turri, J. (2016). How to do better: toward normalizing experimentation in epistemology. In J. Nado (Ed.), Advances in experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology. Bloomsbury Academic.

    Abstract: Epistemic contextualism is one of the most influential and hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. Contextualists claim that “know” is a context sensitive verb associated with different evidential standards in different contexts. Contextualists motivate their view based on a set of behavioral claims. In this paper, I show that several of these behavioral claims are false. I also show that contextualist test cases suffer from a critical confound, which derives from people’s tendency to defer to speakers’ statements about their own mental states. My evidence consists in results from several behavioral experiments. I conclude that contextualism is an idle hypothesis and propose some general methodological lessons.
  28. Turri, J. (2016). Vision, knowledge, and assertion. Consciousness and cognition, 41(C), 41–49.

    Abstract: I report two experiments studying the relationship among explicit judgments about what people see, know, and should assert. When an object of interest was surrounded by visibly similar items, it diminished people’s willingness to judge that an agent sees, knows, and should tell others that it is present. This supports the claim, made by many philosophers, that inhabiting a misleading environment intuitively decreases our willingness to attribute perception and knowledge. However, contrary to stronger claims made by some philosophers, inhabiting a misleading environment does not lead to the opposite pattern whereby people deny perception and knowledge. Causal modeling suggests a specific psychological model of how explicit judgments about perception, knowledge, and assertability are made: knowledge attributions cause perception attributions, which in turn cause assertability attributions. These findings advance understanding of how these three important judgments are made, provide new evidence that knowledge is the norm of assertion, and highlight some important subtleties in folk epistemology
  29. Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2016). Perceived weakness of philosophical inquiry: a comparison to psychology. Philosophia, 44(1), 33–52.

    Abstract: We report two experiments exploring the perception of how contemporary philosophy is often conducted. We find that (1) participants associate philosophy with the practice of conducting thought experiments and collating intuitions about them, and (2) that this form of inquiry is viewed much less favourably than the typical form of inquiry in psychology: research conducted by teams using controlled experiments and observation. We also found (3) an effect whereby relying on intuition is viewed more favorably in the context of team inquiry than in individual inquiry and (4) that greater prior exposure to philosophy lowered one’s opinion of inquiry driven by intuitions and thought experiments. Finally with respect to participant gender, we found that (5) women favored observation over intuition more than men did, and (6) tended to view a question pursued by a research team as more important than men viewed it.
  30. Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge and assertion in "Gettier" cases. Philosophical psychology, 29(5), 759–775.

    Abstract: Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. By asserting we share knowledge, coordinate behavior, and advance collective inquiry. Accordingly, assertion is of considerable interest to cognitive scientists, social scientists, and philosophers. This paper advances our understanding of the norm of assertion. Prior evidence suggests that knowledge is the norm of assertion, a view known as “the knowledge account.” In its strongest form, the knowledge account says that knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for assertability: you should make an assertion if and only if you know that it is true. The knowledge account has been rejected on the grounds that it conflicts with our ordinary practice of evaluating assertions. This paper reports four experiments that address an important objection of this sort, which focuses on a class of examples known as “Gettier cases.” The results undermine the objection and, in the process, provide further evidence for the knowledge account. The findings also teach some important general lessons about intuitional methodology and the curation of genres of thought experiment.
  31. Turri, J. (2016). Perceptions of philosophical inquiry: a survey. Review of philosophy and psychology, 7(4), 805–816.

    Abstract: Six hundred and three people completed a survey measuring perceptions of traditional areas of philosophical inquiry and their relationship to empirical science. The ten areas studied were: aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and political philosophy. For each area, participants rated whether it is currently central to philosophy (centrality), whether its centrality depends on integration with science (dependence), and whether work in the area is sufficiently integrated with science (integration). Centrality judgments tended to be high. Participants viewed nine of the ten areas as central to philosophy (the exception being aesthetics), although they made this judgment more confidently for some areas. Dependence judgments were more varied, ranging from clear disagreement (for logic and history of philosophy) to clear agreement (for philosophies of science, mind, and language). Integration judgments were also varied but exhibited more uncertainty. Some areas whose centrality depended on integration were judged to be well integrated (philosophies of science and mind), but a central tendency for all other areas was ambivalence. Demographic factors had small but statistically significant effects on all three sorts of judgment. Higher age predicted higher centrality judgments and higher integration judgments. Higher socioeconomic status predicted lower dependence judgments and higher integration judgments. Men recorded higher integration judgments.
  32. Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge, certainty and assertion. Philosophical psychology, 29(5), 759–775.

    Abstract: Researchers have debated whether knowledge or certainty is a better candidate for the norm of assertion. Should you make an assertion only if you know it’s true? Or should you make an assertion only if you’re certain it’s true? If either knowledge or certainty is a better candidate, then this will likely have detectable behavioral consequences. I report an experiment that tests for relevant behavioral consequences. The results support the view that assertability is more closely linked to knowledge than to certainty. In multiple scenarios, people were much more willing to allow assertability and certainty to come apart than to allow assertability and knowledge to come apart.
  33. Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge judgments in “Gettier" cases. In J. Sytsma & W. Buckwalter (Eds.), A companion to experimental philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.

    Abstract: “Gettier cases” have played a major role in Anglo-American analytic epistemology over the past fifty years. Philosophers have grouped a bewildering array of examples under the heading “Gettier case.” Philosophers claim that these cases are obvious counterexamples to the “traditional” analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, and they treat correctly classifying the cases as a criterion for judging proposed theories of knowledge. Cognitive scientists recently began testing whether philosophers are right about these cases. It turns out that philosophers were partly right and partly wrong. Some “Gettier cases” are obvious examples of ignorance, but others are obvious examples of knowledge. It also turns out that much research in this area of philosophy is marred by experimenter bias, invented historical claims, dysfunctional categorization of examples, and mischaracterization by philosophers of their own intuitive judgments about particular cases. Despite these shortcomings, lessons learned from studying “Gettier cases” are leading to important insights about knowledge and knowledge attributions, which are central components of social cognition.
  34. Turri, J. (2016). A new paradigm for epistemology: from reliabilism to abilism. Ergo, 3(8), 189-231.

    Abstract: Contemporary philosophers nearly unanimously endorse knowledge reliabilism, the view that knowledge must be reliably produced. Leading reliabilists have suggested that reliabilism draws support from patterns in ordinary judgments and intuitions about knowledge, luck, reliability, and counterfactuals. That is, they have suggested a proto-reliabilist hypothesis about “commonsense” or “folk” epistemology. This paper reports nine experimental studies (N = 1262) that test the proto-reliabilist hypothesis by testing four of its principal implications. The main findings are that (a) commonsense fully embraces the possibility of unreliable knowledge, (b) knowledge judgments are surprisingly insensitive to information about reliability, (c) “anti-luck” intuitions about knowledge have nothing to do with reliability specifically, and (d) reliabilists have mischaracterized the intuitive counterfactual properties of knowledge and their relation to reliability. When combined with the weakness of existing arguments for reliabilism and the recent emergence of well supported alternative views that predict the widespread existence of unreliable knowledge, the present findings are the final exhibit in a conclusive case for abandoning reliabilism in epistemology. I introduce an alternative theory of knowledge, abilism, which outperforms reliabilism and well explains all the available evidence.
  35. Turri, A., & Turri, J. (2015). The truth about lying. Cognition, 13, 161-168.

    Abstract: The standard view in social science and philosophy is that lying does not require the liar’s assertion to be false, only that the liar believes it to be false. We conducted three experiments to test whether lying requires falsity. Overall, the results suggest that it does. We discuss some implications for social scientists working on social judgments, research on lie detection, and public moral discourse.
  36. Turri, J. (2015). Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision. Synthese, 192(12), 4009-4030.

    Abstract: According to factive accounts of the norm of belief and decision-making, you should not believe or base decisions on a falsehood. Even when the evidence misleadingly suggests that a false proposition is true, you should not believe it or base decisions on it. Critics claim that factive accounts are counterintuitive and badly mischaracterize our ordinary practice of evaluating beliefs and decisions. This paper reports four experiments that rigorously test the critic’s accusations and the viability of factive accounts. The results completely undermine the accusations and provide the best evidence yet of factive norms of belief and decision-making. The results also help discriminate between two leading candidates for a factive norm: truth and knowledge. Knowledge is the superior candidate
  37. Turri, J. (2015). Understanding and the norm of explanation. Philosophia,  43(4), 1171–1175.

    Abstract: I propose and defend the hypothesis that understanding is the norm of (the speech act of) explanation. On this proposal, an explanation should express understanding. I call this the understanding account of explanation. The understanding account is supported by social and introspective observations. It is also supported by the relationship between knowledge and understanding, on the one hand, and assertion and explanation, on the other.
  38. Buckwalter, W. & Turri, J. (2015). Inability and obligation in moral judgment. PLOS ONE,10(8), e0136589.

    Abstract: It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that “ought implies can.” We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were repeatedly attributed in tandem with inability, regardless of the type (Experiments 1-3), temporal duration (Experiment 5), or scope (Experiment 6) of inability. This pattern was consistently observed using a variety of moral vocabulary to probe moral judgments and was insensitive to different levels of seriousness for the consequences of inaction (Experiment 4). Judgments about moral obligation were no different for individuals who can or cannot perform physical actions, and these judgments differed from evaluations of a non-moral obligation (Experiment 7). Together these results demonstrate that commonsense morality rejects the “ought implies can” principle for moral requirements, and that judgments about moral obligation are made independently of considerations about ability. By contrast, judgments of blame were highly sensitive to considerations about ability (Experiment 8), which suggests that commonsense morality might accept a “blame implies can” principle.
  39. Turri, J., Buckwalter, W., & Blouw, P. (2015). Knowledge and luck. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 22(2), 378–390.

    Abstract: Nearly all success is due to some mix of ability and luck. But some successes we attribute to the agent’s ability, whereas others we attribute to luck. To better understand the criteria distinguishing credit from luck, we conducted a series of four studies on knowledge attributions. Knowledge is an achievement that involves reaching the truth. But many factors affecting the truth are beyond our control and reaching the truth is often partly due to luck. Which sorts of luck are compatible with knowledge? We find that knowledge attributions are highly sensitive to lucky events that change the explanation for why a belief is true. By contrast, knowledge attributions are surprisingly insensitive to lucky events that threaten but ultimately fail to change the explanation for why a belief is true. These results shed light on our concept of knowledge, help explain apparent inconsistencies in prior work on knowledge attributions, and constitute progress toward a general understanding of the relation between success and luck.
  40. Friedman, O., & Turri, J. (2015). Is probabilistic evidence a source of knowledge? Cognitive science, 39(5), 1062-1080.

    Abstract: We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belong, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).
  41. Turri, J. (2015). Selfless assertions: some empirical evidenceSynthese, 192(4), 1221–1223.

    Abstract: It is increasingly recognized that knowledge is the norm of assertion. As this view has gained popularity, it has also garnered criticism. One widely discussed criticism involves thought experiments about “selfless assertion.” Selfless assertions are said to be intuitively compelling examples where agents should assert propositions that they don’t even believe and, hence, don’t know. This result is then taken to show that knowledge is not the norm of assertion. This paper reports four experiments demonstrating that “selfless assertors” are viewed as both believing and knowing the propositions they assert: this is the natural and intuitive way of interpreting the case. Thought experiments about selfless assertions do not threaten the knowledge account and they do not motivate weaker alternative accounts. The discussion also highlights a general lesson for philosophers: thought experiments intended to probe for mental state attributions should not conflict with basic principles that guide social cognition.
  42. Buckwalter, W., Rose, D., & Turri, J. (2015). Belief through thick and thin. Noûs, 49(4), 748-775.

    Abstract: We distinguish between two categories of belief — thin belief and thick belief — and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the distinction can be applied to debates in the philosophy of mind and metaethics.
  43. Turri, J. (2015). Unreliable knowledge. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 90(3), 529–545.

    Abstract: There is a virtual consensus in contemporary epistemology that knowledge must be reliably produced. Everyone, it seems, is a reliabilist about knowledge in that sense. I present and defend two arguments that unreliable knowledge is possible. My first argument proceeds from an observation about the nature of achievements, namely, that achievements can proceed from unreliable abilities. My second argument proceeds from an observation about the epistemic efficacy of explanatory inference, namely, that inference to the best explanation seems to produce knowledge, even if it isn’t reliable. I also propose a successor to standard versions of reliabilism, which I call ‘ecumenical reliabilism’. Ecumenical reliabilism is consistent with unreliably produced knowledge and helps explain why unreliably produced knowledge is possible.
  44. Turri, J. (2015). Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple testSynthese, 192(2), 385–392.

    Abstract: An impressive case has been built for the hypothesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion, otherwise known as the knowledge account of assertion. According to the knowledge account, you should assert something only if you know that it’s true. A wealth of observational data supports the knowledge account, and some recent empirical results lend further, indirect support. But the knowledge account has not yet been tested directly. This paper fills that gap by reporting the results of such a test. The knowledge account passes with flying colors.
  45. Turri, J. (2015). Skeptical appeal: the source-content bias. Cognitive science, 39(2), 307–324.

    Abstract: Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing, or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e. that something is not the case) than when it’s positive (i.e. that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology .
  46. Turri, J. (2015). An open and shut case: epistemic closure in the manifest imagePhilosophers’ imprint, 15(2), 1–18.

    Abstract: The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report five studies on the status of epistemic closure in ordinary practice. Despite decades of widespread assumptions to the contrary in philosophy, ordinary practice is ambivalent about closure. Ordinary practice does not endorse an unqualified version of the epistemic closure principle, although it might endorse a source-relative version of the principle. In particular, whereas inferential knowledge is not viewed as closed under known entailment, perceptual knowledge might be.
  47. Turri, J., & Blouw, P. (2015). Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking. Philosophical studies, 172(3), 615–634.

    Abstract: Can judging that an agent blamelessly broke a rule lead us to claim, paradoxically, that no rule was broken at all? Surprisingly, it can. Across seven experiments, we document and explain the phenomenon of excuse validation. We found that when an agent blamelessly breaks a rule, it significantly distorts people’s description of the agent’s conduct. Roughly half of people deny that a rule was broken. The results suggest that people engage in excuse validation in order to avoid indirectly blaming others for blameless transgressions. Excuse validation has implications for recent debates in normative ethics, epistemology and the philosophy of language. These debates have featured thought experiments perfectly designed to trigger excuse validation, inhibiting progress in these areas.
  48. Turri, J. (2015). Epistemic situationism and cognitive ability. In M. Alfano & A. Fairweather (Eds.), Epistemic situationism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: Leading virtue epistemologists defend the view that knowledge must proceed from intellectual virtue and they understand virtues either as refined character traits cultivated by the agent over time through deliberate effort, or as reliable cognitive abilities. Philosophical situationists argue that results from empirical psychology should make us doubt that we have either sort of epistemic virtue, thereby discrediting virtue epistemology’s empirical adequacy. I evaluate this situationist challenge and outline a successor to virtue epistemology: abilism. Abilism delivers all the main benefits of virtue epistemology and is as empirically adequate as any theory in philosophy or the social sciences could hope to be.
  49. Turri, J. (2015). From virtue epistemology to abilism: theoretical and empirical developments. In C. B. Miller, M. R. Furr, A. Knobel, & W. Fleeson (Eds.), Character: new directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology. Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: I review several theoretical and empirical developments relevant to assessing contemporary virtue epistemology’s theory of knowledge. What emerges is a leaner theory of knowledge that is more empirically adequate, better captures the ordinary conception of knowledge, and is ripe for cross-fertilization with cognitive science. I call this view abilism. Along the way I identify several topics for future research.
  50. Turri, J. (2015). Assertion and assurance: some empirical evidence. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 90(1), 214–222.

    Abstract: I report three experiments relevant to evaluating Krista Lawlor’s theory of assurance, respond to her criticism of the knowledge account of assertion, and propose an alternative theory of assurance.
  51. Buckwalter, W., & Turri, J. (2014). Telling, showing and knowing: a unified theory of pedagogical norms. Analysis, 74(1), 16–20.

    Abstract: Pedagogy is a pillar of human culture and society. Telling each other information and showing each other how to do things comes naturally to us. A strong case has been made that declarative knowledge is the norm of assertion, which is our primary way of telling others information. This paper presents an analogous case for the hypothesis that procedural knowledge is the norm of instructional demonstration, which is a primary way of showing others how to do things. Knowledge is the norm of telling and showing. It is the prime pedagogical principle.
  52. Millar, J.C., Turri, J., & Friedman, O. (2014). For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 133(1), 79–84.

    Abstract: People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.
  53. Rose, D., Buckwalter, W., & Turri, J. (2014). When words speak louder than actions: delusion, belief and the power of assertion. Australasian journal of philosophy, 92(4), 683–700.

    Abstract: People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren’t beliefs because they don’t guide behavior and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk psychology unambiguously views monothematic delusions as stereotypical beliefs. This calls into question widespread assumptions in the professional literature about belief’s stereotypical functional profile. We also show that folk psychology views delusional patients as holding contradictory beliefs. And we also show that frequent assertion is a powerful cue to belief-ascription, more powerful than even a robust and consistent track record of non-verbal behavior.
  54. Doucet, M., & Turri, J. (2014). Non-psychological weakness of will: self-control, stereotypes, and consequences. Synthese, 191(16), 3935–3954.

    Abstract: Recently philosophers have debated which theory best captures the ordinary concept of weakness of will. Some claim that weakness of will consists in action contrary to an agent's better judgments, while others claim it consists of action contrary to an agent’s intentions. In this paper, we show that the psychological focus on violated commitments — whether judgments, intentions, or both — is too narrow. We begin by showing that many people attribute weakness of will even in the absence of a violated commitment (Experiment 1). We then show that weakness of will attributions are sensitive to two important non-psychological factors. First, for actions stereotypically associated with weakness of will, the absence of certain commitments often triggers weakness of will attributions (Experiments 2-4). Second, and in line with other recent findings, the quality of an action’s outcome affects the extent to which an agent is viewed as weak-willed. More specifically, actions with bad consequences are more likely to be viewed as weak-willed (Experiment 5). So the ordinary concept of weakness of will is sensitive to two non-psychological factors and is thus broader than previous philosophical accounts have recognized. To explain our findings, we propose a two-tier model of weakness of will as a failure of self-control.
  55. Turri, J. (2014). The problem of ESEE knowledge. Ergo, 1(4), 101–127.

    Abstract: Traditionally it has been thought that the moral valence of a proposition is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to whether someone knows that the proposition is true, and thus irrelevant to the truth-value of a knowledge ascription. On this view, it’s no easier to know, for example, that a bad thing will happen than that a good thing will happen (other things being equal). But a series of very surprising recent experiments suggest that this is actually not how we view knowledge. On the contrary, people are much more willing to ascribe knowledge of a bad outcome. This is known as the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE) and is a specific instance of a widely documented phenomenon, the side-effect effect (a.k.a. “the Knobe effect”), which is the most famous finding in experimental philosophy. In this paper, I report a new series of five experiments on ESEE and in the process accomplish three things. First, I confirm earlier findings on the effect. Second, I show that the effect is virtually unlimited. Third, I introduce a new technique for detecting the effect, which potentially enhances its theoretical significance. In particular, my findings make it more likely, though they do not entail, that the effect genuinely reflects the way we think about and ascribe knowledge, rather than being the result of a performance error.
  56. Turri, J. (2014). Reid on the priority of natural language. Canadian journal of philosophy, 41(S1), 214–223.

    Abstract: Thomas Reid distinguished between natural and artificial language and argued that natural language has a very specific sort of priority over artificial language. This paper critically interprets Reid’s discussion, extracts a Reidian explanatory argument for the priority of natural language, and places Reid’s thought in the broad tradition of Cartesian linguistics.
  57. Turri, J., & Friedman, O. (2014). Winners and losers in the folk epistemology of lotteries. In J. R. Beebe (Ed.), Advances in experimental epistemology. Continuum.

    Abstract: We conducted five experiments that reveal some main contours of the folk epistemology of lotteries. The folk tend to think that you don't know that your lottery ticket lost, based on the long odds ("statistical cases"); by contrast, the folk tend to think that you do know that your lottery ticket lost, based on a news report ("testimonial cases"). We evaluate three previous explanations for why people deny knowledge in statistical cases: the justification account, the chance account, and the statistical account. None of them seems to work. We then propose a new explanation of our own, the formulaic account, according to which some people deny knowledge in statistical cases due to formulaic expression.
  58. Turri, J. (2014). Knowledge and suberogatory assertion. Philosophical studies, 167(3), 557–567.

    Abstract: I accomplish two things in this paper. First I expose some important limitations of the contemporary literature on the norms of assertion and in the process illuminate a host of new directions and forms that an account of assertional norms might take. Second I leverage those insights to suggest a new account of the relationship between knowledge and assertion, which arguably outperforms the standard knowledge account.
  59. Turri, J. (2014). You gotta believe. In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (Eds.), Epistemic norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: Proper assertion requires belief. In support of this thesis, I provide an explanatory argument from linguistic patterns surrounding assertion and show how to handle cases of "selfless" assertion.
  60. Benton, M., & Turri, J. (2014). Iffy predictions and proper expectations. Synthese, 191(8), 1857–1866.

    Abstract: What individuates the speech act of prediction? The standard view is that prediction is individuated by the fact that it is the unique speech act that requires future-directed content. We argue against this view and two successor views. We then lay out several other potential strategies for individuating prediction, including the sort of view we favor. We suggest that prediction is individuated normatively and has a special connection to the epistemic standards of expectation. In the process, we advocate some constraints that we think a good theory of prediction should respect.
  61. Turri, J. (2014). Creative reasoning. In J. Turri & P. Klein (Eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: I defend the unpopular view that inference can create justification. I call this view inferential creationism. Inferential creationism has been favored by infinitists, who think that it supports infinitism. But it doesn’t. Finitists can and should accept creationism.
  62. Turri, J. (2013). The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion. Cognition, 129(2), 279–291.

    Abstract: Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. Philosophers have recently built an impressive case that the norm of assertion is factive. That is, you should make an assertion only if it is true. Thus far the case for a factive norm of assertion been based on observational data. This paper adds experimental evidence in favor of a factive norm from six studies. In these studies, an assertion’s truth value dramatically affects whether people think it should be made. Whereas nearly everyone agreed that a true assertion supported by good evidence should be made, most people judged that a false assertion supported by good evidence should not be made. The studies also suggest that people are consciously aware of criteria that guide their evaluation of assertions. Evidence is also presented that some intuitive support for a non-factive norm of assertion comes from a surprising tendency people have to misdescribe cases of blameless rule-breaking as cases where no rule is broken.
  63. Turri, J. (2013). Liberal thinking. Australasian journal of philosophy, 91(3), 515–533.

    Abstract: When you think about a particular object, what makes your thought about that object? Roderick Chisholm, Ernest Sosa and Michael McKinsey have defended ‘latitudinarian’, ‘descriptivist’ or what I call ‘liberal’ answers to that question. I carefully consider the motivation for these liberal views and show how it extends in unanticipated ways to motivate views that are considerably more liberal.
  64. Turri, J. (2013). Knowledge guaranteed. Noûs, 47(3), 602–612.

    Abstract: What is the relationship between saying ‘I know that Q’ and guaranteeing that Q? John Austin, Roderick Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars all agreed that there is some important connection, but disagreed over what exactly it was. In this paper I discuss each of their accounts and present a new one of my own. Drawing on speech-act theory and recent research on the epistemic norms of speech acts, I suggest that the relationship is this: by saying ‘I know that Q’, you represent yourself as having the authority to guarantee that Q.
  65. McKinnon, R., & Turri, J. (2013). Irksome assertions. Philosophical studies, 166, 123–128.

    Abstract: The Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) says that knowledge is the norm of assertion: you may assert a proposition only if you know that it’s true. The primary support for KAA is an explanatory inference from a broad range of linguistic data. The more data that KAA well explains, the stronger the case for it, and the more difficult it is for the competition to keep pace. In this paper we critically assess a purported new linguistic datum, which, it has been argued, KAA well explains. We argue that KAA does not well explain it.
  66. Turri, J. (2013). A conspicuous art: putting Gettier to the test. Philosophers’ imprint, 13(10), 1–16.

    Abstract: Professional philosophers say it’s obvious that a Gettier subject does not know. But experimental philosophers and psychologists have argued that laypeople and non-Westerners view Gettier subjects very differently, based on experiments where they tend to ascribe knowledge to Gettier subjects. I argue that when effectively probed, laypeople and non-Westerners unambiguously agree that Gettier subjects do not know.
  67. Turri, J. (2013). That's outrageous. Theoria, 79(2), 167–171.

    Abstract: I show how non-presentists ought to respond to a popular objection originally due to Arthur Prior and lately updated by Dean Zimmerman. Prior and Zimmerman say that non-presentism can’t account for the fittingness of certain emotional responses to things past. But presentism gains no advantage here, because it’s equally incapable of accounting for the fittingness of certain other emotional responses to things past, in particular moral outrage.
  68. Turri, J. (2013). Infinitism, finitude and normativity. Philosophical studies, 163(3), 791–795.

    Abstract: I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original finite-mind objection, can be redeployed to address the two new objections.
  69. Turri, J. (2013). Doomed to fail: the sad epistemological fate of ontological arguments. In Ontological proofs today. Ontos Verlag.

    Abstract: For beings like us, no ontological argument can possibly succeed. They are doomed to fail. The point of an ontological argument is to enable nonempirical knowledge of its conclusion, namely, that God exists. But no ontological argument could possibly enable us to know its conclusion nonempirically, and so must fail in that sense. An ontological argument will fail even if it is perfectly sound and begs no questions.
  70. Turri, J. (2013). Bi-level virtue epistemology. In J. Turri (Ed.), Virtuous thoughts: the philosophy of Ernest Sosa (pp. 147–164). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.

    Abstract: A critical explanation of Ernest Sosa's bi-level virtue epistemology.
  71. Turri, J. (2012). In Gettier’s wake. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), Epistemology: The key thinkers. Continuum.

    Abstract: A critical review of Gettier cases and theoretical attempts to solve “the” Gettier problem.
  72. Turri, J. (2012). A puzzle about withholding. The philosophical quarterly, 62(247), 355–364.

    Abstract: This paper presents a puzzle about justification and withholding. The puzzle arises in a special case where experts advise us to not withhold judgment. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is genuinely a puzzle, and so leads us to rethink some common assumptions in epistemology, specifically assumptions about the nature of justification and doxastic attitudes.
  73. Turri, J. (2012). Pyrrhonian skepticism meets speech-act theory. International journal for the study of skepticism, 2(2), 83–98.

    Abstract: This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.
  74. Turri, J. (2012). Preempting paradox. Logos & episteme, 3(4), 659–662.

    Abstract: Charlie Pelling has recently argued that two leading accounts of the norm of assertion, the truth account and a version of the knowledge account, invite paradox and so must be false. Pelling's arguments assume that an isolated utterance of the sentence 'This assertion is improper' counts as making an assertion. I argue that this assumption is questionable.
  75. Turri, J. (2012). Reasons, answers, and goals. Journal of moral philosophy, 9, 491–499.

    Abstract: I discuss two arguments against the view that reasons are propositions. I consider responses to each argument, including recent responses due to Mark Schroeder, and suggest further responses of my own. In each case, the discussion proceeds by comparing reasons to answers and goals.
  76. Turri, J. (2012). Stumbling in Nozick's tracks. Logos & episteme, 3(2), 291–293.

    Abstract: Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan have recently proposed an improved version of Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge. I show that, despite its virtues, the new proposal suffers from three serious problems.
  77. Turri, J. (2012). Is knowledge justified true belief? Synthese, 184(3), 247-259.

    Abstract: Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the flaw helps us better understand the nature of knowledge and epistemic justification. I propose a crucial improvement to the traditional view, relying on an intuitive and independently plausible metaphysical distinction pertaining to the manifestation of intellectual powers, which supplements the traditional components of justification, truth and belief.
  78. Turri, J. (2011). Promises to keep: speech acts and the value of reflective knowledge. Logos & episteme, 3(2), 491–499.

    Abstract: This paper offers a new account of reflective knowledge’s value, building on recent work on the epistemic norms of speech acts. Reflective knowledge is valuable because it licenses us to make guarantees and promises.
  79. Turri, J. (2011). Contingent a priori knowledge. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 83(2), 327–344.

    Abstract: I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary.
  80. Turri, J. (2011). A new and improved argument for a necessary beingaustralasian journal of philosophy, 89(2), 357–359.

    Abstract: I suggest two improvements to Joshua Rasmussen’s intriguing recent argument that a causally powerful being necessarily exists.
  81. Turri, J. (2011). Believing for a reason. Erkenntnis, 74(3), 383–397.

    Abstract: This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. I argue that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.
  82. Turri, J. (2011). Manifest failure: the Gettier problem solved. Philosophers’ imprint, 11(8), 1–11.

    Abstract: This paper solves the (real) Gettier problem. The key move is to draw a general metaphysical distinction and conscript it for epistemological purposes.
  83. Turri, J. (2011). The express knowledge account of assertion. Australasian journal of philosophy, 89(1), 37–45.

    Abstract: Many philosophers favor the simple knowledge account of assertion, which says you may assert something only if you know it. The simple account is true but importantly incomplete. I defend a more informative thesis, namely, that you may assert something only if your assertion expresses knowledge. I call this ‘the express knowledge account of assertion’.
  84. Turri, J. (2011). Mythology of the factive. Logos & episteme, 2(1), 143–152.

    Abstract: It’s a cornerstone of epistemology that knowledge requires truth — that is, that knowledge is factive. Allan Hazlett boldly challenges orthodoxy by arguing that the ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. On this basis Hazlett further argues that epistemologists shouldn’t concern themselves with the ordinary concept of knowledge, or knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena. I argue that either Hazlett is wrong about the ordinary concept of knowledge, or he’s right in a way that leaves epistemologists to carry on exactly as they have, paying attention to much the same things they always did.
  85. Turri, J. (2014). Linguistic intuitions in context: a defense of nonskeptical pure invariantism. In A. Booth & D. Rowbottom (Ed.), Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: Epistemic invariantism is the view that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions don’t vary across contexts. Epistemic purism is the view that purely practical factors can’t directly affect the strength of your epistemic position. The combination of purism and invariantism, pure invariantism, is the received view in contemporary epistemology. It has lately been criticized by contextualists, who deny invariantism, and impurists, who deny purism. A central charge against pure invariantism is that it poorly accommodates linguistic intuitions about certain cases. In this paper I develop a new response to this charge. I propose that pure invariantists can explain the relevant linguistic intuitions on the grounds that they track the propriety of indirect speech acts, in particular indirect requests and denials. [Note: this paper was written in 2010-11.]
  86. Turri, J. (2010). Does perceiving entail knowing? Theoria, 76, 197–206.

    Abstract: This paper makes two arguments.  First, it argues against an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it argues that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, in light of that, it argues that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
  87. Turri, J. (2010). Prompting challenges. Analysis, 70(3), 456–462.

    Abstract: I consider a serious objection to the knowledge account of assertion and develop a response. In the process I introduce important new data on prompting assertion, which all theorists working in the area should take note of.
  88. Turri, J. (2010). Foundationalism for modest infinitists. Canadian journal of philosophy, 40(2), 275–284.

    Abstract: Infinitists argue that their view outshines foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas foundationalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be complete. I present four different ways that foundationalists could make sense of those two features of justification, thereby undermining the case for infinitism.
  89. Turri, J. (2010). On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 80(2), 312–326.

    Abstract: I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification.
  90. Turri, J. (2010). Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism. Philosophical review, 119(1), 77–95.

    Abstract: This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts.
  91. Turri, J. (2010). Refutation by elimination. Analysis, 70(1), 35–39.

    Abstract: This paper refutes two important and influential views in one fell stroke. The first is G.E. Moore’s view that assertions of the form ‘Q but I don’t believe that Q’ are inherently “absurd.” The second is Gareth Evans’s view that justification to assert Q entails justification to assert that you believe Q. Both views run aground the possibility of being justified in accepting eliminativism about belief.
  92. Turri, J. (2009). On the general argument against internalism. Synthese, 170(1), 147–153.

    Abstract: I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting.
  93. Turri, J. (2009). The ontology of epistemic reasons. Noûs, 43(3), 490–512.

    Abstract: Epistemic reasons are mental states, not propositions or non-mental facts.
  94. Turri, J. (2009). An infinitist account of doxastic justification. Dialectica, 63(2), 209–218.

    Abstract: Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction.
  95. Turri, J. (2009). On the regress argument for infinitism. Synthese, 166(1), 157–163..

    Abstract: I critically evaluate the regress argument for infinitism, conclude that it should not convince us, and explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification.
  96. Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge as achievement, more or less. In M. A. Fernandez (Ed.), Performance epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: This paper explains performance epistemology and articulates some of its most promising permutations. [Note: this paper was written in 2008.]
  97. Turri, J. (2008). Practical and epistemic justification in Alston's Perceiving God. Faith and philosophy, 25(3), 290–299.

    Abstract: This paper clarifies and evaluates a central premise of William Alston’s argument in Perceiving God. The premise in question: if it is practically rational to engage in a doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to suppose that said practice is reliable. This premise is false, and without it Alston’s main argument fails.
  98. Turri, J. (2005). You can't get away with murder that easily. International journal of philosophical studies, 13(4), 489–492.

    Abstract: I respond to an objection against satisficing consequentialism, due to Tim Mulgan.

entries, reviews, etc.

  1. Turri, J. (2014). Assertion. In R. Audi (Ed.), Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  2. Turri, J. (2014). Ernest Sosa. In R. Audi (Ed.), Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  3. Turri, J. (2014). Thomas Reid. In B. Hill, H. Lagerlund, & R. Stainton (Eds.), Sourcebook in history of philosophy of language. Springer.
  4. Klein, P., & Turri, J. (2014). Infinitism. Oxford bibliographies online.
  5. Turri, J., & Klein, P. (2014). Introduction. In J. Turri & P. Klein (Eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  6. Turri, J. (2013). Epistemology. In B. Kaldis (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage.
  7. Turri, J., & Sosa, E. (2013). Virtue epistemology. In B. Kaldis (Ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy and the social sciences. Sage.
  8. Turri, J. (2013). Satisficing. In Encyclopedia of utilitarianism. Bloomsbury Academic.
  9. Turri, J., & Klein, P. (2013). Infinitism in epistemology. (J. Fieser & B. Dowden, Eds.) Internet encyclopedia of philosophy.
  10. Turri, J. (2012). Review of Achieving knowledge: a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity, by John Greco. Mind, 121(481), 183–187.
  11. Greco, J., & Turri, J. (2012). Introduction. In J. Greco & A. Turri (Eds.), Virtue epistemology: contemporary readings (pp. vii–xii). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  12. Pritchard, D., & Turri, J. (2011). The value of knowledge. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.
  13. Turri, J. (2011). Review of Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke and Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. International journal for the study of skepticism, 1(2), 155–157.
  14. Turri, J. (2011). Critical notice of Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 82(3), 793–797.
  15. Turri, J. (2011). Knowledge. Oxford bibliographies online.
  16. Turri, J., & Sosa, E. (2010). Virtue epistemology. Oxford bibliographies online.
  17. Turri, J. (2010). Epistemic supervenience. In M. Steup, J. Dancy, & E. Sosa (Eds.), Companion to epistemology (2nd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.
  18. Greco, J., & Turri, J. (2009/2011). Virtue epistemology. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.

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