John Turri
Check out published and forthcoming books, articles,
reviews and entries,
and select drafts in progress. Paper
titles take you to an abstract, where you can download
the paper (in .pdf), if you like. Email
me if you'd like some paper in another format.
My CV is available on request.
None posted at the moment.
Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved
This paper provides a principled and elegant solution to the Gettier problem. The key move is to draw a general metaphysical distinction and conscript it for epistemological purposes.
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion
Many philosophers favor the simple knowledge account of assertion, which says you may assert something only if you know it. The simple account is true but importantly incomplete. I defend a more informative thesis, namely, that you may assert something only if your assertion expresses knowledge. I call this ‘the express knowledge account of assertion’.
Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?
This paper accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
Prompting Challenges
I consider a serious objection to the knowledge account of assertion and develop a response. In the process I introduce important new data on prompting assertion, which all theorists working in the area should take note of.
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism
This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts.
Refutation by Elimination
This paper refutes two important and influential views in one fell stroke. The first is G.E. Moore’s view that assertions of the form ‘Q but I don’t believe that Q’ are inherently “absurd.” The second is Gareth Evans’s view that justification to assert Q entails justification to assert that you believe Q. Both views run aground the possibility of being justified in accepting eliminativism about belief.
Contingent A Priori Knowledge
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary.
Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists
Infinitists argue that their view outshines foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas foundationalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be complete. I present four different ways that foundationalists could make sense of those two features of justification, thereby undermining the case for infinitism.
The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons
Epistemic reasons are mental states, not propositions or non-mental facts.
On the General Argument Against Internalism
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification.
An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification
Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction.
On the Regress Argument for Infinitism
I critically evaluate the regress argument for infinitism, conclude that it should not convince us, and explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification.
Practical and Epistemic Justification in Alston's Perceiving God
This paper clarifies and evaluates a central premise of William Alston’s argument in Perceiving God. The premise in question: if it is practically rational to engage in a doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to suppose that said practice is reliable. This premise is false, and without it Alston’s main argument fails.
You Can't Get Away with Murder That Easily
Tim Mulgan argues that satisficing consequentialism cannot make good on its promise to avoid the Demandingness Objection, while at the same time avoid a devastating counterexample. I argue that Mulgan fails to demonstrate what he intends to. However, Mulgan’s argument does pose a challenge to proponents of satisficing consequentialism to spell out in more detail a key component of their theory.
My CV is available on request.
- Epistemology: A Guide, in preparation for Blackwell Publishing. An introduction to epistemology.
- Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, co-edited with John Greco, in preparation for the MIT Press, in the "MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy" series.
- "Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved," forthcoming in Philosophers' Imprint.
- "The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion," forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
- "Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?" forthcoming in Theoria.
- "Prompting Challenges," forthcoming in Analysis.
- "Contingent A Priori Knowledge," forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- "Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists," forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
- "On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification," forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80.2 (March 2010).
- "Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism," Philosophical Review 119.1 (Jan. 2010).
- "Refutation by Elimination," Analysis. 70.1 (Jan. 2010).
- "On the General Argument Against Internalism," Synthese 170.1 (Sept. 2009).
- "The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons," Noûs 43.3 (Sept. 2009).
- "An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification," dialectica 63.2 (June 2009).
- "On the Regress Argument for Infinitism," Synthese 166.1 (Jan 2009).
- "Practical and Epistemic Justification in Alston's Perceiving God," Faith and Philosophy 25.3 (July 2008).
- "You Can't Get Away with Murder That Easily," International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13.4 (Dec 2005).
- “Knowledge,” in preparation for Oxford Bibliographies Online.
- "Virtue Epistemology" (with John Greco), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Dec. 2009).
- "Virtue Epistemology" (with Ernest Sosa), forthcoming in Oxford Bibliographies Online.
- "Satisficing," forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism, ed. James Crimmins and Doug Long.
- Review of Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtue: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- "Epistemic Supervenience," forthcoming in the Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2 ed., ed. Matthias Steup.
None posted at the moment.
Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved
This paper provides a principled and elegant solution to the Gettier problem. The key move is to draw a general metaphysical distinction and conscript it for epistemological purposes.
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion
Many philosophers favor the simple knowledge account of assertion, which says you may assert something only if you know it. The simple account is true but importantly incomplete. I defend a more informative thesis, namely, that you may assert something only if your assertion expresses knowledge. I call this ‘the express knowledge account of assertion’.
Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?
This paper accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
Prompting Challenges
I consider a serious objection to the knowledge account of assertion and develop a response. In the process I introduce important new data on prompting assertion, which all theorists working in the area should take note of.
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism
This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts.
Refutation by Elimination
This paper refutes two important and influential views in one fell stroke. The first is G.E. Moore’s view that assertions of the form ‘Q but I don’t believe that Q’ are inherently “absurd.” The second is Gareth Evans’s view that justification to assert Q entails justification to assert that you believe Q. Both views run aground the possibility of being justified in accepting eliminativism about belief.
Contingent A Priori Knowledge
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary.
Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists
Infinitists argue that their view outshines foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas foundationalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be complete. I present four different ways that foundationalists could make sense of those two features of justification, thereby undermining the case for infinitism.
The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons
Epistemic reasons are mental states, not propositions or non-mental facts.
On the General Argument Against Internalism
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification.
An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification
Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction.
On the Regress Argument for Infinitism
I critically evaluate the regress argument for infinitism, conclude that it should not convince us, and explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification.
Practical and Epistemic Justification in Alston's Perceiving God
This paper clarifies and evaluates a central premise of William Alston’s argument in Perceiving God. The premise in question: if it is practically rational to engage in a doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to suppose that said practice is reliable. This premise is false, and without it Alston’s main argument fails.
You Can't Get Away with Murder That Easily
Tim Mulgan argues that satisficing consequentialism cannot make good on its promise to avoid the Demandingness Objection, while at the same time avoid a devastating counterexample. I argue that Mulgan fails to demonstrate what he intends to. However, Mulgan’s argument does pose a challenge to proponents of satisficing consequentialism to spell out in more detail a key component of their theory.