philosophical science

people

J

T

John Turri

Cognitive Scientist

John is the Canada Research Chair in Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Waterloo.

Publications

Publications

Cross-linguistic disagreement

Lying by omission

Toxic intentions

Knowledge and Justification

Impossible Intentions

Truth, Fallibility, and Justification

A Peculiar and Perpetual Tendency

Objective falsity is essential to lying

Lying, Fast and Slow

Knowledge Attribution and Lotteries

A non-puzzle

Reasons and Basing in Commonsense Epistemology

Knowledge and Truth

Deciding without Intending

Knowledge, Adequacy, and Approximate Truth

Intellectual Inability and Obligation

Cross-cultural Excuse Validation

Experimental Epistemology and "Gettier" Cases

Revisiting Norms

Values and Credibility in Science

Virtue Epistemology and Abilism on Knowledge

Moderate Scientism in Philosophy

Choosing and Refusing

Epistemic Modals and Alternative Possibilities

Exceptionalist Naturalism

The Core Primate Knowledge Concept

The Non-factive Turn

Personal Identity and Persisting as Many

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

How "Ought" Exceeds but Implies "Can"

Knowledge Attributions and Behavioral Predictions

Compatibilism Can Be Natural

It's What's on the Inside That Counts?

Epistemic Contextualism

In the Thick of Moral Motivation

The Point of Assertion is to Transmit Knowledge

Lying, Uptake, Assertion, and Intent

Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments

Knowledge from Falsehood

Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy

The Value of Knowledge

Epistemic Situationism and Cognitive Ability

Knowledge Attributions in Iterated Fake Barn Cases

Virtue Epistemology

Knowledge Central

The Distinctive "Should" of Assertability

Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition

Experimental Work on the Norms of Assertion

Experimental, Cross-cultural, and Classical Indian Epistemology

Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology

Sustaining Rules

Vision, Knowledge and Assertion

How to Do Better

Knowledge and Assertion in “Gettier” Cases

Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases

Knowledge, Certainty, and Assertion

Perceived Weaknesses of Philosophical Inquiry

Perceptions of Philosophical Inquiry

The Radicalism of Truth-Insensitive Epistemology

A New Paradigm for Epistemology

Thomas Reid

The Problem of ESEE Knowledge

Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?

From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism

Selfless Assertions

Excuse Validation

Belief Through Thick and Thin

Unreliable Knowledge

The Truth About Lying

Assertion and Assurance

Skeptical Appeal

Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment

Knowledge and Luck

An Open and Shut Case

Knowledge and Assertion: A Simple Test

Understanding and Explanation

Factive Norms of Belief and Decision

Iffy Predictions

For the Greater Goods?

Ernest Sosa

Introduction to Infinitism

The Folk Epistemology of Lotteries

Infinitism

Suberogatory Assertion

Assertion

Reid on Natural Language

Linguistic Intuitions in Context

Non-psychological Weakness of Will

When Words Speak Louder than Actions

You Gotta Believe

A Defense of Creationist Reasoning

Telling, Showing and Knowing

Satisficing

Liberal Thinking

Doomed to Fail

Epistemology

That’s Outrageous

The Test of Truth

Virtue Epistemology

Knowledge Guaranteed

Presentations

Visual Self-motion, Biological Sex, and the Sense of Self

Questions and Methods

The Approximation Account of Knowledge

Emotion, Control, and the Ethics of Belief

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Lying, Fast and Slow

Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology

Exceptionalist Naturalism

Values in Science Communication

Modesty Is Not a Virtue

Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion

Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment

Modesty Is Not a Virtue

Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion

Comparative Epistemology

Three Factors that Affect the Credibility of Scientific Research

Modesty Is Not a Virtue

Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition

Subsistence Rights and Intuitions about Institutional Obligation

Doxastic Voluntarism and Folk Psychology

Personal Identity and Persisting as Many

When Words Speak Louder than Actions

Inside and Outside, Present and Absent

Ownership Rights and Utilitarian Moral Judgment

Knowledge and Luck

When Words Speak Louder than Actions

The Connection Between Knowledge and Action

Action, Truth and Knowledge

Doxastic Voluntarism and Folk Psychology

Weakness of Will without Commitment Violations

Inductive Risk and Data on Values in Science

Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment

A New Paradigm for Epistemology

Knowledge and Luck

Moral Decision Making and Interpersonal Harm

Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image

Excuse Validation

The Folk Epistemology of Lotteries

Excuse Validation

Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology

The Test of Truth

Counterfactuals and the Scope of Moral Cognition

The Test of Truth

Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion

Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion

Abilism and Reliabilism

Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion

Epistemic Norms and Higher-order Knowledge

Unreliable Knowledge

The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion

Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less

The Gettier Problem Solved

The Gettier Problem Solved

On the General Argument Against Internalism

The Ontology of Reasons

The Basing Relation

Student projects

Student projects

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