philosophical science

people

J

T

John Turri

Cognitive Scientist

John is the Canada Research Chair in Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Waterloo.

Publications

Publications

A Peculiar and Perpetual Tendency

Truth, Fallibility, and Justification

Impossible Intentions

Knowledge and Justification

Toxic intentions

Lying by omission

Cross-linguistic disagreement

Knowledge Attribution and Lotteries

Lying, Fast and Slow

Objective falsity is essential to lying

Intellectual Inability and Obligation

Knowledge, Adequacy, and Approximate Truth

Deciding without Intending

Knowledge and Truth

Reasons and Basing in Commonsense Epistemology

A non-puzzle

Experimental Epistemology and "Gettier" Cases

Cross-cultural Excuse Validation

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Personal Identity and Persisting as Many

The Non-factive Turn

The Core Primate Knowledge Concept

Exceptionalist Naturalism

Epistemic Modals and Alternative Possibilities

Choosing and Refusing

Moderate Scientism in Philosophy

Virtue Epistemology and Abilism on Knowledge

Values and Credibility in Science

Revisiting Norms

In the Thick of Moral Motivation

Epistemic Contextualism

It's What's on the Inside That Counts?

Compatibilism Can Be Natural

Knowledge Attributions and Behavioral Predictions

How "Ought" Exceeds but Implies "Can"

Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments

Lying, Uptake, Assertion, and Intent

The Point of Assertion is to Transmit Knowledge

Knowledge from Falsehood

The Value of Knowledge

Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy

Sustaining Rules

Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology

Experimental, Cross-cultural, and Classical Indian Epistemology

Experimental Work on the Norms of Assertion

Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition

The Distinctive "Should" of Assertability

Knowledge Central

Virtue Epistemology

Knowledge Attributions in Iterated Fake Barn Cases

Epistemic Situationism and Cognitive Ability

Thomas Reid

A New Paradigm for Epistemology

The Radicalism of Truth-Insensitive Epistemology

Perceptions of Philosophical Inquiry

Perceived Weaknesses of Philosophical Inquiry

Knowledge, Certainty, and Assertion

Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases

Knowledge and Assertion in “Gettier” Cases

How to Do Better

Vision, Knowledge and Assertion

Factive Norms of Belief and Decision

Understanding and Explanation

Knowledge and Assertion: A Simple Test

An Open and Shut Case

Knowledge and Luck

Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment

Skeptical Appeal

Assertion and Assurance

The Truth About Lying

Unreliable Knowledge

Belief Through Thick and Thin

Excuse Validation

Selfless Assertions

From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism

Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?

The Problem of ESEE Knowledge

Telling, Showing and Knowing

A Defense of Creationist Reasoning

You Gotta Believe

When Words Speak Louder than Actions

Non-psychological Weakness of Will

Linguistic Intuitions in Context

Reid on Natural Language

Assertion

Suberogatory Assertion

Infinitism

The Folk Epistemology of Lotteries

Introduction to Infinitism

Ernest Sosa

For the Greater Goods?

Iffy Predictions

Infinitism

Irksome Assertions

Infinitism, Finitude, and Normativity

A Conspicuous Art

Bi-level Virtue Epistemology

Knowledge Guaranteed

Virtue Epistemology

The Test of Truth

Presentations

Emotion, Control, and the Ethics of Belief

The Approximation Account of Knowledge

Questions and Methods

Visual Self-motion, Biological Sex, and the Sense of Self

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology

Lying, Fast and Slow

Doxastic Voluntarism and Folk Psychology

Subsistence Rights and Intuitions about Institutional Obligation

Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition

Modesty Is Not a Virtue

Three Factors that Affect the Credibility of Scientific Research

Comparative Epistemology

Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion

Modesty Is Not a Virtue

Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment

Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion

Modesty Is Not a Virtue

Values in Science Communication

Exceptionalist Naturalism

A New Paradigm for Epistemology

Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment

Inductive Risk and Data on Values in Science

Weakness of Will without Commitment Violations

Doxastic Voluntarism and Folk Psychology

Action, Truth and Knowledge

The Connection Between Knowledge and Action

When Words Speak Louder than Actions

Knowledge and Luck

Ownership Rights and Utilitarian Moral Judgment

Inside and Outside, Present and Absent

When Words Speak Louder than Actions

Personal Identity and Persisting as Many

Counterfactuals and the Scope of Moral Cognition

The Test of Truth

Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology

Excuse Validation

The Folk Epistemology of Lotteries

Excuse Validation

Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image

Moral Decision Making and Interpersonal Harm

Knowledge and Luck

Abilism and Reliabilism

Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion

Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion

The Test of Truth

Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion

The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion

Unreliable Knowledge

Epistemic Norms and Higher-order Knowledge

The Gettier Problem Solved

Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less

The Gettier Problem Solved

On the General Argument Against Internalism

The Ontology of Reasons

The Basing Relation

Student projects

Student projects

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