A collection of vigorous debates on some of the most controversial topics in recent theoretical epistemology.
You can disagree with someone even if you don’t speak their language so good.
An objectively compelling case that falsity is truly essential to lying.
Straight from the horse’s mouth, a shocking truth, or thereabout.
“Philosophy” is ancient Greek for “love of an embarrassing and unproductive mess.” No, wait …
Some evidence on how values affect the perceived credibility of science.
The concept of knowledge is an ancient part of our primate heritage.
One of these theories is demonstrably better, and it doesn’t begin with “V”.
Some words do not mean what philosophers think they mean.
Commonsense views humans as exceptional parts of the natural world, capable of resisting deterministic laws.
Some initial evidence that the ordinary concept of modesty might be primarily behavioral.
The “ought implies can” principle is false but reflects something true about moral language.
Multiple ordinary concepts of belief relate differently to moral motivation.
When we predict what people will do, what they know matters more than what they think.
Sometimes we judge that someone lied without judging that they intended to deceive.
Judgments about how someone should act cause judgments about what they know.
This experiment supports the hypothesis that transmitting knowledge is the point of assertion.
Enabling the unreliable masses to transcend their lack of virtue.
Studies show that Locke was right, Descartes was wrong.
Scientists observe hybridization of compatibilism and incompatibilism in commonsense morality.
They said truth didn’t matter. It turns out they shouldn’t have.
A condensed review of the definitive case that knowledge is a central norm of assertion.
Surprising similarities between contemporary commonsense and ancient Indian philosophy.
Philosophers make a mess. Science cleans it up. You're welcome.
Assertion is more closely linked to knowledge than it is to certainty.
In case you were wondering what philosophers think about philosophy.
Philosophy’s self-inflicted public relations problem: a report from the field.
Even in a highly misleading environment, perception provides knowledge.
Don't believe the hype: you should believe the truth.
How some different forms of probability affect knowledge attributions.
The best evidence yet of factive norms of belief and decision-making.
Based on new findings, we propose a new model of weakness of will as a failure of self-control.
The objections never end. Good thing the solutions don’t either.
Solving the fake problem that set epistemology back decades. With a microwave.
Armchairs usually don’t get such good mileage.
A theory about the relationship between having justification for beliefs and forming justified beliefs.
Four responses to one view with approximately two proponents.
Some observational evidence on how we ask questions and challenge answers.