You can disagree with someone even if you don’t speak their language so good.

Evidence that assertion is essential to lying.

Pick your poison … and intention.

On the ordinary view, if you know, then you’re justified.

It’s possible to intend what you think is impossible.

More on the truth about how truth truly matters.

I did not just show that you can’t prove a negative.

An objectively compelling case that falsity is truly essential to lying.

Some people can’t handle the untruth.

Some ins and outs of lotteries.

When you ain’t got nothing, you got nothing when you lose.

Reasons are causes, inside your mind and out.

How is knowledge like horseshoes?

Evidence that you can decide to do something without intending it.

Straight from the horse’s mouth, a shocking truth, or thereabout.

Cognition doesn’t care either. Sorry.

Americans and Koreans engage in excuse validation at similar rates.

“Philosophy” is ancient Greek for “love of an embarrassing and unproductive mess.” No, wait …

Would it help if I said it louder?

Some evidence on how values affect the perceived credibility of science.

The concept of knowledge is an ancient part of our primate heritage.

Yo, science! Philosophy needs your help. Badly.

One of these theories is demonstrably better, and it doesn’t begin with “V”.

You’re going the wrong way.

Two places. One time. No Problem.

Some words do not mean what philosophers think they mean.

It is conceptually possible to form beliefs at will.

Knowledge is a central norm of assertion in Korean too.

Commonsense views humans as exceptional parts of the natural world, capable of resisting deterministic laws.

The best evidence to date for compatibilism in commonsense morality.

Some initial evidence that the ordinary concept of modesty might be primarily behavioral.

The “ought implies can” principle is false but reflects something true about moral language.

Multiple ordinary concepts of belief relate differently to moral motivation.

That dog won’t hunt.

When we predict what people will do, what they know matters more than what they think.

Sometimes we judge that someone lied without judging that they intended to deceive.

Judgments about how someone should act cause judgments about what they know.

This experiment supports the hypothesis that transmitting knowledge is the point of assertion.

It’s possible to infer knowledge from a false premise.

Philosophers broke it. We fixed it.

Enabling the unreliable masses to transcend their lack of virtue.

Studies show that Locke was right, Descartes was wrong.

Judgments about what people know feature centrally in how we evaluate them.

A theory of rules for managing belief.

Scientists observe hybridization of compatibilism and incompatibilism in commonsense morality.

They said truth didn’t matter. It turns out they shouldn’t have.

Proving philosophers wrong, one barn at a time.

A condensed review of the definitive case that knowledge is a central norm of assertion.

Surprising similarities between contemporary commonsense and ancient Indian philosophy.

There's a new king in town.

Philosophers make a mess. Science cleans it up. You're welcome.

Assertion is more closely linked to knowledge than it is to certainty.

In case you were wondering what philosophers think about philosophy.

You get bonus points if you act like you care.

Philosophy’s self-inflicted public relations problem: a report from the field.

Even in a highly misleading environment, perception provides knowledge.

Can someone please send philosophers another copy of this memo?

Don't believe the hype: you should believe the truth.

Morality doesn’t care. Get over it.

Don’t worry, it’s all good.

Assertion, assurance, and speech. Oh my.

I blazed the trail, so you don’t have to.

How to break a rule without “breaking” it.

Dear Closure Principle, don’t hit the door on your way out.

Psychological roots of skeptical doubt.

Knowing increases assertability by 35000%.

Unreliably produced knowledge is so possible that it happens all the time.

Multiple ordinary concepts of belief relate differently to knowledge.

Sometimes when your examples are confusing, people fix it for you.

How some different forms of probability affect knowledge attributions.

How some different forms of luck affect knowledge attributions.

Observational evidence that explanations should express understanding.

The best evidence yet of factive norms of belief and decision-making.

Evidence that saying something false is essential to lying.

WAM! BAM! POW! A theory is born.

Yeah, you heard me right.

No way you’ll predict what we argued in this paper.

Observational evidence regarding belief and proper speech.

Is it always wrong to say a bad thing?

What, you didn’t know? You’re such a loser.

A natural basis for artificial language.

Based on new findings, we propose a new model of weakness of will as a failure of self-control.

“You’re not my father!” Hmm.

Should you sacrifice one rug to save the many? Step aboard to find out.

One thing to rule them all, and in our knowledge bind them.

A summary of a leading epistemologist’s theories.

Shed a tear for the ontological argument’s sad epistemological fate.

The objections never end. Good thing the solutions don’t either.

At present, I can’t think of a good reason to not get emotional.

Philosophers love this finding.

You’re saying it wrong.

An authoritative theory of guarantees.

Pushing academics to be way more liberal than they already are.

Wherein the truth (should) be told.

A simple “wrong” would have done just fine.

This theory is cool but probably false.

Reasons might be answers and goals.

Remember that time when you tried to say something but failed? Me neither.

Among the most anticipated social events since a certain super-couple’s wedding. Or divorce. Or something.